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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper attempts to identify the macroeconomic variables determining private 
investment using a time series data over the period 1975 to 1998. In addition to this, 
faced with two apparently different periods both in ideology and policy –orientation 
over the period, to see the performance of macroeconomic variables performance 
after post-reform period in general, private investment trend in particular in 
comparison with pre 1992 will be reviewed at length. This is done, due to the 
problem faced to estimate the two periods separately because of the short –time 
period for the later. Thus it is hoped that the review of macroeconomic variables 
using levels, ratio and average growth rate have been employed to help enable the 
reader to have the insight of the policy change effects since the reform. 
 
All data used in the analysis are secondary data collected from different government 
agencies such as government Ministries and academic institutions. The model used 
in econometric regression is an eclectic version of flexible accelerator model 
designed to capture some of the key determinants of private investment behaviour. 
In this study, however, due to difficulty in identifying the theoretically correct 
specification and obtaining the necessary and reliable data in Ethiopia, this paper 
does not attempt to build and estimate a full-scale structural model of private 
investment in Ethiopia. As a result, it is more of exploratory data analysis. 
Accordingly, macroeconomic variables included in the regression are real per capita 
GDP growth rate, public investment, credit availability to private sector, foreign 
exchange reserve availability, real exchange rate, consumer price index and 
government budget deficit. The estimation results show that real per capita GDP 
growth rate, credit availability to private sector and foreign exchange reserve 
availability appear to have had positive impact and significantly affect private 
investment in the country. While real exchange rate, consumer price index and with 
lesser extent of government budget deficit look to have had negative effect on 
private investment in Ethiopia over the period 1975-1998. 
 
Public sector investment unlike the recent empirical findings in developing was 
found to substitute the private sector in Ethiopia rather to complement it. This is not 
surprising because the majority of the years estimated had fallen in the period where 
government capital budget, which is used as a proxy public investment, used to 
establish state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the remaining years out of 24 
that expected to have the positive impact out weighed by seventeen years negative 
influence. Real exchange rate was also found to influence the sector negatively over 
the period. The result looks confirmed the existing situation of real exchange rate in 
both periods. The first, pre-reform period used to be with multiple and over 
valuation which acted as a tax on export while the post-1992 is the devaluation 
period with gradual adjustment to the parallel market having negative impact on the 
returns to investment as it increases the cost of capital goods imported in a short 
time period. 
 
Definitions and Abbreviations 
                                  Definition 
Domestic Investment: - refers to investment committed or made by domestic investor. 
Domestic investor in this study denotes Ethiopian or foreign national permanently 
residing in Ethiopia having made on investment and Ethiopian born foreign national 
desiring to be considered as a domestic investor.  
 
Approved Investment Projects: - refers to investment projects that have received 
investment permits either from EIA, or from the regional investment bureaus. 
 
Projects under implementation: - refers to those approved investment projects which 
have started practical activities such as civil engineering works, Construction of factory 
buildings, purchasing of machineries and equipment but not started production or 
service rendering. 
 
Projects that have Commenced Operation: - refers to those approved projects, which 
have either partially or full completed their implementation phase and began production 
or services. 
 
Terminated: - refers to projects whose investment permits are returned by the investor, 
or projects whose investment permits are cancelled as per article16-2 of the investment 
proclamation No 37/1996.  
 
Inactive projects: - refers to those projects in 1992 and 1993 and have not yet started 
their implementation program so far. 
                                 Abbreviation 
 
AMRY - Average Marginal Rate for the year 
 
EFDRE - Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
 
EIA - Ethiopia Investment Authority 
 
ERP - Economic Reform Program  
 
G & NFS – Goods and net factor Services  
 
G &S - Goods and Services  
 
MEDaC - Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation 
 
MOF- Ministry of Finance  
 
NEB- National Bank of Ethiopia 
 
SAP- Structural Adjustment Program  
 
SSACS- Sub-Saharan African Countries 
 
TGE- Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
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I.   Introduction 
 
 
It is commonly and widely thought that investment is the engine of growth. Following 
this view, a number of empirical studies have been made on source of economic growth. 
These studies have produced import findings. These findings have claimed that capital 
accumulation is by far the most important contributor to economic growth in developing 
countries followed by addition of labour inputs (Robinson and Sherman. 1971 Otai and 
Villanueva 1973). The view that capital accumulation matter so much in developing 
countries is also consistent with what is known about the pattern and process of 
economic development .It is also intuitively plausible that developing countries lack 
capital and are much less technically advanced. For capital scarce and labour abundant 
economies providing workers with a little more capital to work with can increase 
productivity and out put very significantly.  
 
With this view many developing countries have designed their development strategy 
since the end of World War II. These strategies are different among these developing 
countries. Some have followed out- ward looking development strategy while others 
have pursued in-ward looking development strategy. Countries followed by out-ward 
looking development strategy have put at the centre the prime role of private sector 
while the in word looking known with pervasive role of public investment in the 
economy.  
 
Because of the contraction of aggregate demand in many developing countries which 
also associated with different external shocks, “import substitution strategy ” got 
dissatisfaction as it depends on narrow domestic market and public sector dominated 
investment. Therefore, there is a growing realization that the recovery of private sector 
is required as it leads to higher efficiency of scarce resource use and adjusts to the 
changing global situation. It is now widely accepted that the expansion of private 
investment should be the source of economic growth. The recovery and expansion of 
private sector also central to the success of adjustment and sustainable economic 
growth. To this effect, the role of private sector as compared to public investment has 
also been investigated. It has been argued that the marginal productivity of private 
investment is mush higher and thus plays a more important role in the growth process 
than does public investment (Khan and Recinhart, 1990).  
  
Recognizing the importance of private investment for economic growth, recent attention 
is focusing on its determinants taking in to consideration the specific situation of 
developing countries that is lack of data availability such as on capital stock, real wages, 
real financial service return rates for debt and equity, and imperfect capital markets. 
 
Among the developing economies those who have pursued the development of import 
substitution strategy, Ethiopia was used to be one country. During the period 1974-
1991, for almost two decades, the country had been following the socialist; Marxism- 
Leninism was being the guiding ideology and central planning is the main instrument of 
economic transformation. During this period, the private sector was severely restricted 
from the participation in the economic activities in the country by the promulgation of 
the proclamation No. 26/1975, (the nationalization proclamation). As a result, private 
investment as percentage to GDP was being significantly dropped. For instant, it was 
dropped from 6.8 in 1975 during very beginning of the policy shift to socialist ideology 
to 1.9 % in 1989 where the socialist government recognized what was going on in the 
economy and declared what it called “ mixed economy”. Then after, the private sector 
start to recover and this sign of recovery was reinforced by complete move of the 
policy from the Socialist ideology and import substitution to market based and out-ward 
looking development strategy since 1992.  
 
The transitional Government of Ethiopia, which took power from the socialist regime, 
had led the country for about four years with the principle of market - based economy. 
In order to materialize the intention of putting the private sector at fore front in the 
economy, the Transitional Government promulgated investment proclamation No. 
15/1992. The newly promulgated investment proclamation has created good investment 
environment particularly for domestic investors, which lifted the majority of restrictions 
to the private investors. After exercising for some years this proclamation, two 
successive amendments have been made with the objective to enhance the participation 
of both domestic and foreign investments. Particularly, the last proclamations No. 
37/1996 have made remarkable progress with regard to the participation of foreign 
investments aimed at attracting substantial foreign capital. With regard to the institution 
to implement investment policy and incentives, “Investment office of Ethiopia,” which 
then renamed “Ethiopia investment Authority (EIA),” was established. The authority is 
accountable for investment Board that is chaired by prime minister. Along with this 
office, Regional Investment Bureaus were established to implement investment policy 
and incentives as the country have pursued decentralization of political power to 
regional states. Regional states have the power to formulate and have their own 
respective investment policy and incentives with in the environment of the federal 
investment policy and incentives.  
 
As a result, a significant recovery in private sector has been observed since 1992. This 
could be revealed based on the number of projects approved by the Ethiopia investment 
Authority and Regional investment Bureaus. Following the issuance of proclamation No. 
15/1992, beginning from July 1992 up to January, 2000, 5369 projects have got permit 
(investment licences), with planned investment capital of 56,782,72 billion Birr and 
these projects when put in to operation they are supposed to create job opportunity for 
about 256, 947 and 477,781 permanent and temporary respectively. Out of which 5,144 
projects are domestic investment licensed and con thought to create for about 227,061 
permanent and 432,690 temporary employment opportunities. In spite of the enormous 
number of projects licensed, the real investment rate is by far less than satisfactory. 
For instance, out of the licensed project stated above only 28,25 percent have been put 
into operational and 19.05 have started implementation process. The remaining more 
than 50% project did not yet start any process of realization of the projects. Obviously, 
these show that there is some other problems behind to be investigated despite the 
various measures and gradual amendment of investment proclamation to further 
encourage and promote private sector. Thus the evidence that during the past seven 
years the ratio of actual (real) investment to planned investment over seven years 
period was very low. This low achievement rate is despite considerable effort to 
remove macroeconomic imbalances, the introduction and gradual amendment of 
investment legislation with generous incentives and an attempt to remove the 
restrictions imposed on private investment in the past legislations.  
   
 
The reasons for the poor performance of private investment during the Derg regime 
(1975- 1991) are many, among them some are restrictive polices (both on amount of 
capital i.e. ceiling and line of business that is not more than one business) a constraining 
business environment (such as credit restrictions to the private sector), and the over all 
uncertainty about the existing situation and future course of economic policies because 
of the impression of the early nationalization during the Derg regime. 
 
In spite of the relative increase in private investment since the introduction of Economic 
Reform Program (ERP), private sector response has been the least sati factory aspect 
of ERP.  The ratio of private investment to GDP averaged 4.8 per annum for the period 
1975-1998.  When it is observed by separating the two distinct policy courses during 
the period 1975-1991, the average rate was 3.5 per annum while the remaining period 
averaged 7.9 percent to GDP.  However, it has been showing a significant progress 
over the previous period, still the rate is very low as compared to the average rate for 
Sub-Saharan African counties excluding South-Africa. For instance, during the period 
1986 -1998 11.7 percent for Sub-Saharan African Countries, while for the same period 
the average rate for Ethiopia was 5.5 percent per annum. The rate of private investment 
growth for Ethiopia even lower than this figure if account is taken for the “investment 
transfer” from the public to private sector as the result of privatisation program under 
structural Adjustment Program (SAP).  Thus, the low level and rate of growth of 
private investment has been a major problem and will be in the future confronting policy 
makers in the country. 
 
The objective of this paper is an attempt to identify major determinants of macro 
economic variables on private investment during the period 1975-1998.  Specific 
objectives of the study are: - to identify macroeconomic variables that explain the low 
level and rate of investment growth, to analyse the effect of policy changes on private 
investment growth over the period under consideration and lastly to draw some 
conclusions remarks. 
 
As will be shown later, the studies on determinants of private investment are few and 
far in between. The paper has a number of limitations in many aspect (1) the problem of 
identifying the correct model specification (2) the adequacy and reliability of data on 
macroeconomic variables in general and data on private and the limited knowledge 
about the subject matter and (3) few and limited theoretical and empirical literatures on 
the determinants of private investment are among the factors that limit the scope of this 
paper. Adding to these limitations are the period under study includes two virtually 
distinct policies, which supposed to have opposite impact on the private sector. Though 
it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, it may be useful in identifying major problems 
that hinder the investment activities in the country. 
 
The source of data for both trends and empirical analysis of the determinants of 
macroeconomic variables on private investment are secondary.  These data are 
collected from different Government Ministries and institutions in the country with few 
data sources from international organization (such as IMF, WB, ECA etc). The coverage 
of the data is uncertain since not all enterprises are registered.  Aggregate investment 
data might miss most of data on non-formal unregistered private investments.  Another 
problem of the data is the inadequacy and unreliability for some of macroeconomic 
variables included in the study.  As a result, it is difficult to produce strong policy 
conclusions.  Nevertheless, the results have highly suggestive of important area for 
policy action. 
 
The methodology used in an attempt to learn more about the determinants of private 
investment activities in the country, is econometric regression using OLS method over 
the period 1975 to 1998. Following the approach taken in recent study of national 
savings behaviour (Aghevli et. al 1990), this paper provides a preliminary look at how 
various macroeconomic variables have affected private investment activity during this 
period in Ethiopia.  Among the factors examined in the regression analysis are the 
following (a) real per capita GDP growth rate; (b) public investment to GDP (c) credit 
availability to GDP; (d) foreign exchange reserve availability to GDP;  (e) real 
exchange rate; (f) consumer price index and (g) government budget deficit to GDP.  
Because of the difficulty in identifying theoretically correct specification and obtaining 
the necessary data, this paper does not attempt to build and estimate a full-scale 
structural model of private investment in the country.  Rather, it is more of an 
exploratory data analysis, however, the results of this study may be useful in identifying 
the more fundamental relationships between private sector investment and macro 
economic variables in Ethiopia, which can then be used for appropriate policy direction 
in this country. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: the second chapter deals with the over view of the 
performance of Ethiopian economy over the period under study with more emphasis on 
recent macroeconomic variable of the post – 1992.  The third chapter deals with the 
literature survey of the determinants of private investment.  In the fourth chapter the 
performance of private invest separately seen by dividing the period in to two with the 
interest to see the private sector in two-policy environment. Chapter five deals with the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of macroeconomic variables using econometric 
regression.  In the empirical analysis of the determinants of private investment, OLS 
will be used.  The final chapter will present the concluding remarks. 
II. OVER VIEW OF ETHIOPIAN ECONOMY 
                       2.1 Aggregate Output  
The prior indicator of the status of once economy is its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and its growth rate. According to this indicator, gross domestic product growth rate by 
industrial origin at 1981 constant factor cost during the year between 1981-19991, on 
average was at about 2.0 per cent per annum during the last decade of the Socialist 
regime (here after called Dreg regime) ending in1991. On the other hand, population 
growth had been growing at 2.6 per cent per annum during the same period. From the 
two indicative figures, it can be suggested that during this period, the GDP per capita 
had been dramatically declining (See table2.1). 
             Annual Average Growth Rates of GDP by Industrial Origin at 1981 
Constant Factor  
                                                 Cost. 
       Table 2.1 
Sector Annual Average Growth Rate (%) 
1981-
9991 
1981-
1992 
1981-1998 1993-1998 
1.Agriculture 
and Allied 
Activities  
1.1 
Agriculture 
(proper) 
1.2 
 
1.0 
1.4 
 
1.2 
2.1 
 
2.3 
3.4 
 
6.6 
2. Industry 1.3 0 1.7 7.3 
3. All 
Services 
3.6 2.8 3.9 7.7 
4. GDP at 
constant 
factor cost 
(1981) 
2.0 1.7 2.7 5.5 
5. Population 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.1 
6. Real per 
Capita GDP 
-0.4 -1.0 -0.1 3.2 
                        Source: Average Growth Rates are Computed From appendix A, table A1  
                 NB: All Growth Rates shown have been computed by using Ordinary 
Least-Squares Method.  
 
Contributing factors to be mentioned among others were, the open and protracted war, 
the recurrent draught created during the period, and moreover, the centrally planned 
economy and the rapid and intensified state owned parastatals had led the economy to 
dramatically turn down due to the inefficient utilization of scarce productive resources 
which had resulted in high opportunity cost. 
 
The Derg regime begun with the confiscation of the private property, by the tenet of 
“Social and Communal ownership” and the private sector was marginalized and 
moreover, legally prohibited from not having more than one business line. The business 
line allowed for the private sector was in the area of small and medium industries with 
ceiling capital of 500,000 Ethiopian Birr. The regime was over thrown through military 
struggle and the period preceding the war was one of dramatic structural change. After 
the advent of peace, a process of economic reform has undertaken since the advent of 
peace and at the same time the government has made an effort to pursue prudent 
financial policies based on fiscal discipline while strengthening democratic participation 
as per the agreement on the charter of the transitional government. After the 
establishment of the transitional government then Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE) has launched a wide range covering “Economic Reform Program (ERP)” 
to help enable the economic recovery since 1992. The post economic reform program 
spanning 1992 to 1998 is the special interest of this study to see the respond of the 
private sector to the rapid structural and institutional reforms undertaken. 
 
A recovery in economic performance has been registered since the introduction of 
economic reform program. Real GDP by industrial origin grew at an average rate of 
about 5.5 per cent per annum during the period 1992 to 1998. According to the 
classification of Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (here after 
MEDaC), GDP comprise three sectors, Agriculture and Allied activities, Industry, and All 
Services. According to this classification, the profound real GDP growth rate has come 
from two sectors. The up surge in industrial and Service sectors which grew on annual 
average rate of 7.3 and 7.7 per cent respectively over the year 1993 - 1998. The 
intensive emergency recovery and rehabilitation effort, and accompanied by economic 
reform program made possible the incapacitated manufacturing sector efficient as a 
result of improved availability of inputs and spare parts. Further, the Economic Reform 
Program has helped rectify both factor and product markets distortions. The 
performance of agricultural sector has also registered significant average growth rate 
per annum over the period, given the recurrent draught occurred in 1994. During the 
post reform period ending 1998 the sector grew on average 3.4 per cent per annum 
from the historical growth rate of one per cent per annum. 
 
Another stance to look at the economy is the expenditure side of GDP, to have the 
insight of the resource gap. As most of the Sub- Saharan African countries, Ethiopia 
also known to be with huge resource gap. The share of the three components of 
aggregate demand (private expenditure, government expenditure and investment or 
gross domestic capital formation) as shown in the table below revealed that 82, 11 and 
20 per cent of GDP in 1998 respectively. This shows that the country’s domestic 
expenditure significantly exceeds domestic production. The excess, 13 per cent, 
indicates the resource gap (i.e. exports – Imports). The performance of the external 
sector, which will be discussed in the next sub-section, showed that although, exports 
have shown a satisfactory performance since 1992, it failed behind the growth of 
imports as reflected by its average 15 per cent share of GDP in contrast to a more than 
28 per cent share in GDP of imports in 1998. Domestic saving (measured as a residual 
between GDP at current market prices and consumption expenditure) and Gross 
Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) has exhibited an increasing trend both in level 
terms and relative to GDP through out the post reform ending in the 1998. The  
                 
              Expenditure on GDP at Current Market Prices (1991- 1998) 
 Table 2.2                                                                             
Expenditure Components Annual Average 
growth rates 
Share as % of 
GDP (1991) 
Share as % of 
GDP (1998) 
 Gross domestic 
expenditure 
   Consumption expenditure 
      Government 
      Private 
Gross capital Formation 
Resource Balance 
      Export of G&S 
      Import of G&NFS 
GDP at Current Market 
prices 
11.6 
10.3 
12.1 
10.1 
15.3 
(29.9) 
23.9 
19.9 
11.1 
1072 
95.5 
16.5 
80 
10.4 
(-6.9) 
5.5 
12.5 
--- 
113 
93.2 
11.3 
81.8 
20.2 
(13.3) 
15 
28 
--- 
Domestic Saving 
Net factor Income from Row 
Net current transfer from 
Row 
 
Gross National savings 
22.1 
 
(5.9) 
 
11.8 
 
 6.8 
 
0.55 
 
7.5 
 
 19.0 
 
13.8 
Source:  Figures are computed from Appendix A, table A2 
Note: -  -Annual average growth rates shown have been computed by OLS method 
 -Numbers in the parenthesis are negative growth rates 
 
Share of Gross Domestic Capital Formation in GDP has almost doubled (20.2%) after 
post reform period under consideration from a mere 10.4 per cent of GDP at the very 
beginning of the reform program 19991. During the same period domestic saving 
increased from 3.4 per cent of GDP to around 7 per cent of GDP ending the 1998. 
Domestic saving has still managed to finance only one – third of the Gross Domestic 
capital Formation. This suggests that the resource gap is financed from external 
sources, which has its implication for the economy in debt service burden in the future. 
2.2 Inflation Trends in Ethiopia 
In general in Ethiopia, the rate of change in over all price level (inflation) has been 
traditionally moderate in standard of other Sub-Saharan African countries (table 2.3). 
There were few years that the ratio was in double digit. According to some other studies 
these years coincided with the occurrence of the historical recurrent draught that has 
resulted in crop failure and food supply shortage as the country’s agricultural sector 
virtually depend on rainfall. The sector provides about 80 per cent employment and 95 
per cent of agricultural supply comes from small-scale private peasant holdings. Thus, it 
is not surprising that if said the two-digit inflation occurrence is as the result of crop 
failure due to rainfall shortage. Although, the reason behind for low inflation in Ethiopia 
is not certainly known, presumably, contributing factors are the low level of economic 
development coupled with the leading role of agricultural sector in the economy, 
featured by non-monetization and the nature of macroeconomic policies pursued are 
believed to have strong bearings on this out come. 
 
              Inflation trend in Ethiopia and average for SSACs excluding South 
Africa 
Table 2.3 
 198
0 
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
Ethiopi
a 
12.
5 
1.9 7.
3 
3.
4 
-
.25 
18.
4 
4.6 9.5 2.2 9.6 5.2 20.
9 
21.
9 
9.9 1.7 13.4 0.9
SSACs 35.
7 
37.
0 
40 65 25.
6 
23.
9 
22.
8 
19.
9 
32.
6 
17.
6 
29.
2 
34.
4 
34.
6 
19.
1 
191.
3 
134.
9 
28
2. 
Continued… 
 1997 1998 1999 
Ethiopia -6.2 2.3 4.8 
Sub-Saharan African Countries 115 132 112.0 
Source: - National Bank of Ethiopia (Ethiopia) 
 - Economic development Indicators for SSACs  
 
After post-reform the prices also dropped significantly, especially in contrast to 
average rate of 20 per cent two years before the reform. In 1993, annually inflation rate 
registered only 10 per cent and this favourable performance was achieved in spite of 
the adverse effects on prices induced by the sharp devaluation of Birr (Ethiopian 
currency) in October 1992. The average annual rate hardly exceeded 10 per cent in 
most post-reform period beginning from February 1992 reflecting that inflation was 
contained in single digit. This is attributed to a combination of factors. The main 
reasons mentioned for this achievement are, inter alia, tight fiscal and monetary 
management, domestic production recovery, interest rate adjustment, and the relative 
stability of nominal exchange rate (MEDaC, 1999). In Ethiopia for the post - reform 
years with timely seasonal and fair distribution of rain fall through out the region would 
led to good crop harvests, given the sluggish aggregate demand coupled with 
demobilization of huge army force after advent of peace have remarkably contributed to 
the contain of inflation below two digit as opposed to the experience of other 
transitional economies. The impact of good weather that lowered the prices of good and 
services should be given special attention, especially in view of the fact that the 
movement in prices are historically connected with seasonally and fair distribution of 
rain fall.              
 
 It is therefore that the rate of inflation has not been so tempered so much through 
boosting supplies as through managing demand. This is to mean that as and when 
private investment recovers and there is also a recovery in effective demand and hence 
inflationary pressures are likely to be up warding. All though price rose in 1995, the 
recent trend marked once again the beginning of a downward trend, to the extent of 
coming down to as low as 0.9 per cent in 1996, and further down to 6.2 per cent below 
zero the following year. However, it again registered positive rate for the following two 
year, 4.8%, particularly in 1999 (see table 2.3).  
Nevertheless, the general price level in Ethiopia is still fair to say lower by other 
standard of transitional and developing economies .The deceleration of inflation rate 
coupled with up ward revision of nominal interest rate enabled the real interest rate to 
be positive on annual average rate basis 
Table 2.4 Exchange rates, Foreign Auction Markets and Real Deposit Rates after 1992 
Devaluation.     
Year 
 
Foreign Exchange Auction Parallel Market Real 
deposit 
interest 
rates 
Rates in Birr per $ (end year rates) 
Marginal Highest Lowest AMFY End 
year 
Average 
for the 
year 
1992 5.10 6.56 5.00 5.01 7.60 7.60 -12 
1993 6.22 6.52 5.90 5.77 6.80 7.05 2.6 
1994 6.32 6.45 6.25 6.25 7.70 7.30 11.5 
1995 6.85 6.55 6.32 6.32 7.55 7.64 6.0 
1996 7.05 7.16 6.99 6.47 7.18 7.16 5.5 
1997 8.12 7.21 7.00 6.88 8.00 7.89 3.7 
198 8.13 8.15 8.05 8.02 8.2 8.05 1.2 
Source: national Bank of Ethiopia, 1999  
 
Another achievement of the reform process is the narrowing of the difference between 
the official and parallel exchange rates. The efficiency of the auction market, as 
measured by some parameters, has constantly been improving during 1993 to 1999. 
The average spread between the highest and the lowest bid rates stood at 1.7% in the 
first half of 1996 after declining from 18.9% in 1995 and 4.8% in 1996 (NBE, 1999). The 
narrowing of the spread in these parameters is an indication of the efficiency of auction 
market .In general, given the over all tendencies that the marginal auction rate to 
depreciate and that the parallel exchange rate remain stable, the probable out come in 
the near future is towards complete convergence of the two (see table 2.4). 
2.3 External Sector and Balance of Payment (BOP)  
The structure and level of development of the economy, its openness, resource 
endowments and past economic policies pursued to large extent determine the export 
structure of a country. Being underdeveloped economy that heavily depend on 
agriculture; the structure of Ethiopian exports is dominated by agricultural products, 
which alone accounted for more than 90 per cent of the export proceeds of the country. 
Among the agricultural products, coffee accounts for the lion’s share with around 70 per 
cent of agricultural export and 60 per cent of the total export proceeds. Hide and Skins 
and “Chat” distantly followed second and third accounting on average for 12 and 7 per 
cent of the total exports, respectively. 
 
Table 2.5 Major Commodity Export Share as percentage of the Total Export 
Item/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Coffee 0.53 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.73 
Hide and 
Skins 
0.17 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09 
Chat 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 Source: Calculated from table 2.6 
 Coffee has been the dominant export item as far back as the 1960s making-up on 
average 55 – 60 per cent of the total exports. Recent data from the NBE indicate that 
coffee has now becoming even more dominant. From 1994 to 1997, coffee alone 
accounted for 66 per cent of the total exports on average. Hide and skins were the 
second important export items that successively showed a trend of improvement until it 
reached its peak of 21 per cent of total exports in 1992 (NBE, 1994).    
 
             Table 2.6 Value of Exports by Major Commodity Groups in ‘000 Birr’ 
Item/ year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Coffee 28845
1 
16382
4 
47512
7 
71801
9 
17990
35 
17240
08 
23073
9 
2827947
.2 
Hides and 
skins 
92206 58645 13451
5 
20361
0 
37354
9 
32100
1 
37225
3 
347642 
Pulses and oil 
seeds 
19349 769 5226 71891 15341
8 
11916
2 
16127
9 
417798.
8 
Chat 20422 5073 65727 10793
2 
17233
9 
17444
4 
21795
8 
272606.
4 
Total 54248
5 
27902
6 
80081
4 
12387
29 
27320
44 
25390
8 
36177
90 
3865994
.4 
           Source: National Bank of Ethiopia 
 
An encouraging performance has been registered in export sector during the post-reform 
period. The trade balance has never got surplus, however. Export earnings have 
registered a continuous revival from 154 million USD in 1992 just one year before the 
beginning of the reform to 600 million USD in 1998. The recovering of export sector 
during the post-reform period, due mainly to the reform program package under taken 
with the objective to encourage the sector. Among the policy measures under taken to 
remove the bias against the export sector are, the devaluation of exchange rate by 58% 
(i.e. 2,07 Birr / USD to 5.0 Birr /USD/ and gradual adjustment to the parallel exchange 
rate  (un official rate), Introduction of foreign exchange auction market, the suspension 
of taxes and duties on export goods except on coffee in January 1993, the introduction 
of export duty draw back scheme in August, 1993, subsequent reduction and 
elimination of the foreign exchange surrender requirement ,and allowing of exporters to 
open foreign exchange deposit accounts in commercial banks. With regard to imports, a 
gradual step by step measure have been under taken to liberalize protected domestic 
marks to induce competition on domestic market and hence efficient utilization of 
scarce resources. Accordingly, the maximum tariff rate was reduced to 50 per cent from 
the high of 230 per cent. The numbers of tax exemption were also declined from 327 to 
138, and the weighted average tariff rate has been brought down to 21 percent. 
Simplification of the system of import licenses and reduction of the negative lists has 
also been under taken as part for simplification and standardization of customs 
clearance procedures (FDRE, 1996b).  
  
The above-mentioned measures undertaken to liberalize the external sector have helped 
the private sector recovering in external sector. The participation of the private sector 
which had been marginalized during the socialist (Derg) regime has become dynamic 
with its share in export earnings growing continuously from 18 percent in 1992 to 63 
percent in 1997 (see table 2.7). How ever, the revival in private sector participation has 
not been changed significantly either in the volume or the diversification of export from 
the traditionally exported goods (coffee, hide and skin, oil seeds and pulses which are 
virtually all agricultural commodities). As shown in Table 2.6 Ethiopia’s export has 
been and still is highly dependent on a few agricultural products. Undoubtedly, this 
structure of exports makes the country’s external sector susceptible to adverse shocks 
that affect both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the Ethiopian economy.  
 
 Table 2.7 Annual Foreign Exchange Earnings from Merchandise Export. (In Million 
Birr) 
Operator/Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Private Sector 74.4 158.9 264.4 1317.8 1344.4 2084.0 
Government  318.6 393.3 367.2 1418.4 1150.5 1223.8 
Total 392.8 552.3 631.6 2736.2 2494.9 3307.8 
Share of total (%) 
. Private 
. Government 
100 
18 
82 
100 
28.8 
71.2 
100 
41.9 
58.1 
100 
48.2 
51.8 
100 
53.9 
46.1 
100 
63.0 
37.0 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia. 
  
Triggered by the demand due to the recovery and reconstruction, imports have also 
showed significant increase over the post-reform program period. Merchandise import 
was valued at 874.8 million USD in 1992, which now rose to 1.45 billion USD in 1998. 
The lion share of imports has been accounted for by capital and consumer goods, which 
altogether accounted for 64% of imports during the period 1992 -1997  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Imports by End Use  
Table 2.8                                                       
( In Million USD) 
Source:- National Bank of Ethiopia. 
Item/ year ! 992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Raw Material 13.7 20.6 14.9 20.9 29 31.2 32.6 
Semi finished 
G. 
76.9 94.9 129.3 182.8 253.2 269.8 267.5
Chemicals 7.9 35.3 33.1 36.6 51 58.9 51.1 
Fertilizers 43.0 3.8 11.8 44.3 101.4 109 110.9
Textile M. 8.7 11 11.8 17.4 24.3 26 25.9 
Fuel 120.4 198 222.3 168.9 214.9 231.9 224.5
Capital Goods 226.0 382.0 238.6 333.7 460.2 515 485.7
Transport 162.6 251.9 109.6 140.2 192.2 234.1 201.3
Agricultural 1.2 2.7 5.8 20.4 28.2 32.3 35.10
|Industrial 62.3 127.4 123.2 173.1 239.8 248.6 249.3
Consumer 
Goods 
260.2 334.7 291.3 340 425.1 322.5 406.9
Durables 66.4 81.6 79.7 90.9 113.7 118.6 114.0
Non Durables 193.8 253.1 211.6 249.1 311.4 203.9 292.8
Food 131.0 167.4 126.4 180.6 215 109.9 208.5
Medical 16.5 38.2 37.3 35.2 41.4 41.7 40.6 
Textiles 34.3 21.3 20 20.2 25.3 25.8 25.7 
Total 874.8 1051.8 914.6 1063 1412.9 1403.1 1450.5
 Chronic trade deficit has remained the dominant feature of Ethiopia’s merchandise 
external sector for a long period of time. This trend has also kept on even during the 
post-reform period as export earnings have still fallen behind the import bill. However, 
the resource gap has been bridged by huge in flow of foreign capital. The official 
foreign capital inflow has helped the recovery of the reserve position. As a result, the 
reserve position that reached a mere 4.3weeks of import in 1992 recovered to 33.1 
weeks of import in 1996 but slightly declined to 22.6 weeks of import in 1997. It also 
further declined to 18 week of import in 1998. The fact that the recovery of the reserve 
position of the country relied much on the external resources puts a question on the 
sustainability of the reserve position and should cause a concern for urgent need of 
export base diversification in order to boost earnings from export of the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 1.7 Indicators of Balance of Payment Position (BOP)      (In Million USD) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Exports 542. 5 222. 4 279. 6 453.6 410. 2 604. 4 600 
Imports 874. 8 1051. 8 914. 6 1063 1412. 9 1403. 1 1456. 5 
Trade Balance - 332. 3 -829.4 - 635. 1 - 609. 4 - 1002. 7 -798.7 - 850. 5 
Net Services  -23.1 10. 9 60. 8 95. 1 99. 6 88. 7 
Private transfer  247. 9 246. 9 311. 2 313. 4 258. 1 334. 1 
Current Account 
Balance 
 -604. 4 - 377. 2 - 237. 4 -594. 2 - 448. 7 - 427.8 
Capital Account  -128 236. 3 8. 6 -11. 3 - 54. 9 174. 8 
Errors and Omissions  233. 5 23.6 - 37. 6  124. 7 - 116. 9 - 145. 9 
Over all Balance  - 98. 8 167.7 161. 6 - 89. 1 - 386. 7 - 107. 5 
Reserve in Weeks of 
Imports 
4.3 14. 7 28.3 30. 2 33. 1 22. 6 18 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia 
 
2.4. Public finance  
The expanded role of the government in all aspects during the period 1974 to 1991 
resulted in significant development of the public sector relative to others. Government 
diversify its role, to provide basic infrastructure and social services while at the same 
time engaged in the production and distribution of consumption goods and services, 
which entailed that the establishment of a number of institution and parastatals 
enterprises to achieve the set development strategy. As a result, the out come of these 
development put pressure on government budget which led to persistent and widening 
fiscal deficit and other macroeconomic imbalances.   
Government performance Indicators 
Table 2.10 (In million Birr) 
Year Domest
ic 
Revenu
e 
Total 
Expend
iture 
Deficit GDP Ratio to GDP Percentage charge over the 
previous year 
     Revenu
e 
Expend
iture 
Defici
t 
Exp Rev Def. GDP 
1981 1757.1 2296.5 -539.4 10721.
3
16.4 21.4 -5.0 -- -- -- --
1982 1876.6 2649.8 -773.2 11280.
9
16.6 23.5 -6.9 15.4 6.8 15.4 5.2
1983 2174.5 3807.6 -
1633.1 
12540.
0
17.3 30.4 -
13.0
43.7 15.9 43.7 11.2
1984 2293.8 3198.1 -904.3 11849.
3
19.4 27.0 -7.6 16.0 5.5 16.0 5.5
1985 2323.2 3924.5 -
1601.3 
13876.
2
16.7 28.3 -
11.5
22.7 1.3 22.7 17.1
1986 2806.1 4131.1 -
1325.0 
14493.
3
19.4 28.5 -9.1 5.3 20.8 5.3 4.4
1987 2925.8 4136.3 -
1210.5 
15501.
2
18.9 26.7 -7.8 0.1 4.3 0.1 7.0
1988 3467.1 5058.1 -
1591.0 
15996.
9
21.7 31.6 -9.9 22.3 18.5 22.3 3.2
1989 3899.2 5912.4 -
2013.2 
16873.
4 
23.1 35.0 -
11.9
16.9 12.5 16.9 5.5
1990 3142.8 5369.2 -
2226.4 
17821.
7 
17.6 30.1 -
12.5
9.2 19.4 9.2 5.6
1991 2706.7 4852.4 -
2145.7 
19815.
6 
13.7 24.5 -
10.8
9.6 13.9 9.6 11.2
1992 2207.9 4205.3 -
1997.4 
20793.
0 
10.6 20.2 -9.6 13.3 18.4 13.3 4.9
1993 3191.2 5219.4 -
2028.2 
26552.
0 
12.0 19.7 -7.6 24.1 44.5 24.1 27.7
1994 3938.8 7093.8 -
3155.0 
28355.
0 
13.9 25.0 -
11.1
35.9 23.4 35.9 6.8
1995 5912.7 8372.0 -
2459.3 
34063.
0 
17.4 24.6 -7.2 18.0 50.1 18.0 20.1
1996 6966.1 10194.
0
-
3227.9 
38771.
0 
18.0 26.3 -8.3 21.0 17.8 21.8 13.8
1997 7877.4 10017.
2
-
2139.8 
41465.
0 
19.0 24.2 -5.2 1.7 13.1 1.7 6.9
1998 8400.1 11460.
0
-
3059.9 
45188.
8 
18.6 25.4 -6.8 14.4 6.6 14.4 9.0
Source: -Revenue and Expenditure accounts – Ministry of Finance, Data on GDP are 
from MEDaC  
 
Leaving aside the question of the desirability and feasibility of growing of the public 
sector, the decade 1980s marked with significant growth both in total government 
expenditure and revenue. However, annual growth in total expenditure (averaging about 
9 per cent) had exceeded growth in revenue, which averaged at around 6 percent per 
annum during this period. By the year 1990, total expenditure stood up the level of Birr 
5369.2 million (30 per cent of GDP) while revenue was Birr 3142.8 million (17.6 percent 
of GDP). Both revenue and expenditure attained their peak performance level during the 
Derg regime in 1989 amounting to 23 and 35 percent of nominal GDP respectively. 
 
 A part from fast growth of revenue, government expenditure during the Derg period 
had also serious structural problems. Capital expenditure during this period accounted 
for around 29 percent of total expenditure on average, while the remaining 71 per cent 
attributed to recurrent outlays. A significant portion of the recurrent budget used to be 
allocated for defence out lays, which in later years of Derg claimed to be accounted for 
30 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure. Despite remarkable growth in revenue, 
the Derg period was marked by worsening budget deficit as a ratio to GDP increased 
from 5 in 1981 percent to about 12 per cent in 1990.  
 
After the over thrown of the Derg regime the transitional government of Ethiopia, 
established in July, 1991,have initiated a market based economic policy accompanied by 
a comprehensive economic reform program. As stated on the statement of the 
objectives of the reform program, among the stated objectives was rectifying the fiscal 
ills and attain a consolidated government budget (TGE, 1992). The strategy to achieve 
the objective was rationalizing the role of the government in the economy, reorientation 
of the expenditure and reinforcing through enhancement of revenue performance at the 
same time. Reviewing the reform program for fiscal policy and stating the policy 
measures that have been undertaken is beyond the scope of this study. The purpose of 
looking at the public sector in this paper is whether there is a change in fiscal trend 
during the post-reform period, which supposed to have substantial signal to private 
sector, 
      
Given the strong recovery in domestic production (particularly industry and service 
sectors) and enhanced inflow of external resources have helped government attain a 
prudent and sound fiscal environment during the post- reform period ending in 1998. 
Fiscal deficit excluding grants declined subsequently from about 11 per cent of GDP in 
1991 to about 5 percent of GDP in 1997. It again rose to around 6.8 per cent in 1998. 
Government borrowing from the domestic banking system gradually declined and 
government began to effect net repayment of loan owed to the banking system since 
1995 sizable portion of the budget was financed from the external sources. The over all 
improvement in fiscal soundness also witnessed by the capacity of the government to 
finance increasingly large part of capital expenditure out of domestic revenue having 
fully covered the recurrent portion of total expenditure.  
  
                      The structure Of Government Expenditure (1986-1998) 
Table 2.11       (In million Birr)                      
Year Recurrent 
Expenditur
e 
As% 
of 
Total 
Capital 
expendi
ture 
As % 
of 
Tota
l 
Total 
Expen
di. 
Capital 
Expen
d as % 
GDP 
Recurr
ent 
Expen
di. 
As% 
GDP 
Total 
expen
di. 
As % 
GDP 
1986 2659.3  1471.8  4131.1 10.2 18.3 28.5 
1987 2754.1 64.4 1382.2 35.6 4136.3 8.9 22.5 26.7 
1988 3598.9 66.6 1459.2 33.4 5058.1 9.1 23.5 31.6 
1989 3972.7 71.2 1939.7 28.8 5912.4 11.5 22.0 35.0 
1990 3929.1 67.2 1440.1 32.8 5369.2 8.1 22.4 30.0 
1991 3640.1 73.2 1214.1 26.8 4854.2 6.1 18.4 24.5 
1992 3253.5 75.3 951.8 24.7 4205.3 4.6 15.6 20.2 
1993 3434.5 77.6 1784.9 22.4 5219.4 6.7 12.9 19.7 
1994 43399.5 65.8 2694.3 34.2 7093.8 9.5 15.5 25.0 
1995 5215.5 62.0 3156.5 38.0 8372.0 9.3 15.3 24.6 
1996 5582.2 62.3 3562.6 37.7 10194.
0
9.2 14.2 26.3 
1997 5716.2 57.8 4299.9 42 10016.
0
10.4 13.8 24.2 
1998 7094.9 62.0 4265.1 38 11460.
0
9.4 15.7 25.4 
Source: - Compiled from MOF Revenue and Expenditure Accounts 
 
 Domestic revenue has achieved about 21 per cent annual average growth rate, the 
period spanning 1992 to 1998. In absolute terms, it increased from about Birr 2.2 billion 
in 1992 to an estimated Birr 8.4 billion in 1998. Its ratio to GDP thus increased from 
10.6 per cent in 1992 to around 19 per cent in 1998. Performance of government 
expenditure has also been equally impressive .Its growth averaged 15.4 per cent per 
annum for the period 1992 to 1998 which is well below the rate of growth in revenue 
collection. Un like the Derg period, much of the growth in total expenditure was 
accounted for by capital expenditure whose share in total spending increased from 22.6 
per cent in 1992 to 42 per cent in 1997. In 1998, however, the share of capital and 
recurrent expenditure was 38 and 62 per cent respectively owing to less than 
satisfactory performance of capital projects and perhaps, this might be due to the effect 
of the Ethio-Eritrean boarder conflict since may 1998.  
 
In line with the government’s priority area of intervention, road construction and social 
sector kept on obtaining an increasing share of public capital expenditure, while the 
share of agriculture, industry and mining has declined. The gap is, supposedly, bridged 
via the participation of the emerging private sector in those productive sectors. Near 
one- fourth of the total capital expenditure was channelled to roods construction while 
the share of education and health sectors in total expenditure almost double as 
compared to its level at the beginning of the reform period.  
 
Recurrent expenditure grew at a lower rate than capital expenditure during the reform 
period and its ratio to GDP dropped from a pre-reform period of 22 per cent to about 
15 per cent in recent in recent years. The share of defence in recurrent spending has 
substantially declined from 45 per cent during the last there years of the Derg to about 
14 to 15 per cent in 1996 and 1997 (see for detail Appendix---). 
2.5 Monetary Aggregate and Banking  
                                        2.5.1 Monetary Aggregate  
 Monetary aggregates have used to be the indicator of over all macro-economic 
performance. This is because, monetary aggregates can be influenced both by the level 
of economic growth and economic policies. During the period of the Derg regime, for 
instance, the widening budget deficit was financed virtually from domestic bank 
borrowing which claimed to be the main source of monetary expansion. The foreign 
capital inflow was so small that it had little role on the expansion of monetary base 
(M2). Despite the prevalence of the negative real interest rate on deposits, savings have 
been growing on average rate of 10 per cent per annum during the Derg mainly because 
of the absence of alternative investment outlet for the private sector financial resources. 
The absence of alternative investment outlets had helped the government to channel 
cheap financial resources to government owned enterprises. These cheap financial 
sources again had fostered the expansion of the state owned enterprises with relatively 
stable macro-economy. 
 
The stability of macroeconomic variables did not sustain for a long time, as it came at 
the expense of a week economy and financial sector performance. During this period, 
the private sector legally restricted not to engage in financial sector. As a result, there 
was only one commercial bank owned by the government with the lion share of both 
deposits and credit and a few not more than two specialized banks, which again owned 
by the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Trends in monetary Aggregates  
    Table 2.12                 
(In Million Birr) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1980
-
1990
1991
-
1998
Domestic credit 8937 1010
6
1216
7
1274
4
13873 1541
1
1714
6 
1893
1 
12.0 9.8
. Claims on Gov. 6022 7032 7825 9616 9024 7888 8797 9372 15.7 3.2
. Claims on other 2915 3072 4342 3128 4849 7523 8349 9559 7.6 20
Foreign Assets 
(net) 
288 403 810 3765 4659 6236 5551 5724 -4.1 48
. National Bank 138 108 159 2143 2345 4901 2874 1963 -- --
. Commercial 
bank 
150 295 651 1622 2314 1335 2677 3761 -- --
Brother items 
(Net) 
1263 1498 2455 4910 4529 5991 6185 6034 -- --
Broad money 7962 9011 1052
2
1159
9
14003 1565
5
1651
1 
1862
1 
11.6 12.1
Money (M1) 6135 6845 7712 8373 9909 9917 9980 1097
0 
12.2 7.5
   . DD 2314 2529 2827 3214 4066 4261 4803 6220 13 14.4
   . Cur. In 
circulation 
3821 4316 4885 5159 5843 5657 5178 4750 11.6 1.8
Quasi Money 1827 2166 2810 3226 4094 5737 6531 7651 9.7 21.6
. Saving deposit 1679 2002 2459 2845 3649 4984 5699 6485 13.1 20.6
. Time deposits 148 164 351 38 445 753 832 1166 -6.1 29.6
 Source: - National Bank Of Ethiopia (NBE) 
 
The reforming of the financial sector and monetary policies pursued were at the centre 
of Economic Reform Program launched since 1992 with a broader objective of 
stabilizing the macro-economy and create an effective and efficient financial sector 
which enabling to facilitate fast economic growth. A number of reform measures have 
been taken along this line including the adjustment of interest rates, so as to render 
positive interest rates on financial assets and allowing for market determination of the 
interest rates by setting only the minimum deposit and maximum lending rates. Since 
January 1998, however, the ceiling on the lending rate was removed. Discriminatory 
interest rates for credit to channel to privileged sector and clients had been also 
suspended to rectify market distortions. Allowing the private sector in financial sector 
that had been marginalized from this sector during the Derg was also among the ERP. 
As a result, seven commercial banks, nine insurance companies and nine micro- 
financial institutions and have started their financial inter miadatry role in the economy 
(national bank of Ethiopia, 1999). Another financial reform measure under taken was, 
permitting specialized banks to participate in commercial banking activities. A bi- 
weekly auction market for treasury-bills with three categories of maturities introduced 
since January 1995 that has helped avoid the crowding out effect of the government 
borrowing from the domestic banks while laying the ground for capital market 
development in Ethiopia. 
 
Unlike the period of the 1980s when bank claims on central government grew by about 
16% per annum, the post reform period witnessed at 3.2% annual growth rate. Hence, 
growth in the stock of domestic credit averaged 9.8% for the period 1992 –1998, 
despite a remarkable growth (20% per annum) in credit to non- government borrowers. 
Moreover, the share of government borrowing in total domestic credit declined to 
49.5% in 1998 from a pick of 70% in 191992. This was made possible by the ERP aimed 
at stabilizing the macroeconomic imbalances in general, the prudent fiscal policy 
pursued in particular. The foreign assets position of the banking sector, on the other 
hand, grew by 48% per annum on average since 1992 reversing the 4% decline during 
the 1980s. Hence foreign assets of the banking sector have been an increasingly 
important determinant of the expansion of the monetary base (M2) during the reform 
period under consideration. The annual average rate of expansion of the monetary 
during the reform period ending in 1998, therefore, stood at about 12 per cent nearly 
equal to 11.6% growth during the Derg, but now it is consistent with growth of nominal 
GDP. 
Owing to favourable environment created for mobilization of savings, interest bearing 
deposits (quasi-money) have been growing at about 21% per annum during the post –
reform period. While currency in circulation was declining in absolute terms. This 
probably reflects that the economic agents’ (saving agents) recognition of the 
opportunity cost of holding money in terms of foregone interest bearings. This opposes 
markedly about 12% annual average expansion in currency out side banks during the 
1980s. Demand deposits on the other hands increased by 14% per annum during the 
same period which mainly is attributed to the expansion of business activities. Given the 
commendable developments outlined above, slow down in the growth of outstanding 
credit to the private sector and modest increase in that of the government has been 
observed since 1996. On the other hand, the rate of growth in the interest bearing 
deposits have also decelerated, particularly that of saving deposits. 
   
2.5.2 Banking 
With regard to banking activities, owing to the maintenance of positive real interest 
rates and attainment of economic recovery, deposit mobilization of commercial banks 
during the post reform years (1992-1998) expanded faster (17.0%). Much of the growth 
in total deposit during the Derg period was attributed to an average growth rate of 
10.2% and 11.9% of demand and saving deposits which supposedly, the influence of 
negative real interest rate on time deposit in resource mobilization.  
During the post reform periods, all types of deposits have been increasing, including 
time deposit, which has been growing by an average rate of 17.0%. Despite the 
emergence of the private banks, the commercial bank of Ethiopia (state owned –bank) 
achieved an average growth rate of 17.0% in deposit mobilization which further helped 
increase in its average share in total deposit mobilization to 87.6% during the 1992 – 
1998. As a result, the liberalization of the financial sector, which involved the 
establishment of private banking and insurance companies, has not witnessed with a 
remarkable expansion of private banks and the sector is still dictated by the 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia with its monopoly power.  
Despite the preferential access to bank credit by the socialized sector, gross credit 
channelled for non–government borrowers that is the private sector, public enterprises, 
and cooperatives declined at an average annual rate of 6% per annum during 1981 to 
1991. Credit flow to the private sector had showed a declining trend over the period 
under the socialist regime (derg), reflecting the marginalisation the private sector in the 
economic endeauovers. The fact that new investment and expansion of public 
enterprises had been undertaken through government capital budget resulted in decline 
of their credit absorption at an average annual rate of 8 per cent during the Derg period 
although they accounted for about 60 per cent of the total credit. Following the lifting of 
restriction on private sector endeavours as well as discriminatory interest rates among 
sectors, the flow of credit to private sector during the period 1992 to 1998 had been 
growing at a faster rate as opposed to the pre- reform. On the other hand, credit flow 
to the public enterprises kept on declining during the post reform period as a result of 
the process of privatisation and limited new investment or expansion in public 
enterprises. 
          
                               Credit disbursement by Clients  
Table 2.13                 
(In Million Birr)  
Client/ Year  1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Public 547.5 1052 877.8 694.2 478.9 454.4 482. 517.4 454 387.5 207.5
enterprise  4
Cooperatives  23.4 58.9 53 76.3 35 60.2 94.2 169 178 139.7 119.8
Private  227.5 386.5 362.8 284.9 230.3 211.1 172.
4
205.4 187.6 204.3 216.5
Total  798.4 1497.
4 
1293.
6
1055.
4
744.2 725.7 749 891.8 819.6 731.5 543.8
Share of Total 
(%) 
    
-  Public 
enterprise  
68.6 70.3 67.9 65.8 64.4 62.6 64.4 58.0 55.4 53.0 38.2
-  
Cooperative  
2.9 3.9 4.1 7.2 4.7 8.3 12.6 19.0 21.7 19.1 22.0
-  Private  28.5 25.8 28.0 27.0 30.9 29.1 23.0 23.0 22.9 27.9 39.8
 
 
 
 
Continue… 
Client/ Year  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Public enterprise  229.8 627.8 239.7 216.8 621 379.1 163.9
Cooperatives  77 124.7 99.4 425.4 524.7 434.5 550.3
Private  247.1 723.8 1411 2695.9 2949.3 3145.3 3867.1
Total  550.3 1476.3 1750.1 3338.1 4093.6 4018.3 4581.3
Share of Total 
(%) 
   
-  Public 
enterprise  
41.7 42.5 13.5 6.5 15.2 9.4 3.6
-  Cooperative  13.4 8.4 5.7 12.7 12.8 12.3 12.0
-  Private  44.9 49.1 80.6 80.8 72 78.3 84.4
 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia  
 
The reform measures under taken have shifted the credit structure disbursement in the 
post reform period as evidenced by large portion of credit to private sector. Hence, in 
period 1992 to 1998, the average share of credit to the private sector rose to 70 per 
cent while of that of public enterprises dropped to 18.9 per cent. The share of 
cooperative stood at 10 to 11 per cent both before and after the reform program. There 
has been a general tendency of a slowdown in the rate of growth of credit in recent 
years as compared to the fast expansion in the earlier years of the reform, which could 
be explained by the slowdown of the boom in demand for credit at the beginning of the 
reform program.  
The post reform period, has also witnessed with the lion share of credit has been 
coming from commercial Bank of Ethiopia, which still dominating the banking sector. It 
looks very difficult to compete with CBE who has already achieved economies of scale 
in the sector. Under this circumstance, it takes time takes time in banking sector to 
have competitive environment, unless some structural reform will be under taken on 
this government owned bank (CBE). However, liberalization of financial sector is so 
sensitive for the economy of like Ethiopia of which the financial sector is so 
rudimentary. A gradual process of financial sector is required after liberalization of 
other sectors (domestic market and external sector). However, promoting the 
competitive environment of domestic financial sector is helpful for efficient allocation of 
the scarce financial resources. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ON DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
It is commonly and widely thought that investment is the engine of economic growth. 
Those who acknowledge that this is over simplified view of the relationship would 
nevertheless argue that although other consideration may be relevant, investment is 
likely to be the major constituting factor to economic growth (Deane 1983). This view 
has implicitly, and some times explicitly, under pinned substantial elements of 
government policy in developing countries in influencing the determinants of investment. 
Following this view, concerned people in the area such as economists, researchers and 
policy makers have undertaken enormous empirical analyses.  
The empirical studies on the source of output growth have produced a number of 
important findings. These findings have claimed that capital accumulation is by far the 
most important contributor to economic growth in developing countries followed by 
addition of labour inputs (Ray 1998, Otani, and Villanueva 1973). The findings that 
capital accumulation matters so much more to economic growth in developing countries 
than in developed countries is also consistent with what is known about the pattern and 
process of economic development. It is also intuitively plausible. By and large, 
developing economies lack capital and are much less technically advanced. The only 
resource in which they have an abundant supply off is unskilled labour force. The 
growth of such economy will be enhanced by the injection of physical capital embodying 
low level of technology (Stoneman, p. and J. Vicks, 1988).   
 
For capital scarce and labour abundant countries, providing workers with a little more 
capital to work with can increase productivity and output very significantly and rapidly 
(Gross, 1996). This is specially true if investment made in  “ social capital” such as 
transport, education and communication facilities are provided as these increase a 
country’s productive capacity and facilitate its direct productive activities (Abramovitz, 
1986). At the same time, the use of capital will increase the division of labour and bring 
with it the gains from specialization, which can be very considerable  (Krugman, 1997).  
There are, therefore, strong a priori reasons for capital accumulation being so crucial to 
the economic growth of developing countries. That is why governments of developing 
countries gave more emphasis on capital formation in formulating development plan. 
 
After World War II, most of developing countries followed development strategy of 
inward–orientation for different reasons. The strategy is explained by heavy 
intervention of government in the economy. The economy of these countries is known 
by its import substitution policies with a high rate of import protection, multiple and 
over valued exchange rates and repressed financial markets (Balassa, 1989; Rodrik, 
1995).  Recently, however, with the growing dissatisfaction of this development 
strategy, due mainly to inefficient performance of public sector dominated investment 
activities, market-based development strategy has been gaining a greater degree of 
acceptance from both academics and policy makers. 
 
There is also a growing realization that adjustment to the changing global environment 
of the 1990s requires the recovery of private investment that leads to a higher 
efficiency in the utilization of resource and serves as a positive signal to foreign 
investors (Deane 1983; Chhibber, dailamo, and Shafik 1992). Private domestic 
investment in developing countries needs to be seen not only as a contributor to 
economic growth and employment generation, but also a catalyst to attract foreign 
direct capital. Resurgence in private investment is a necessary ingredient of a 
sustainable recovery in heavily indebted developing countries (Rodrick, 1989). The 
legacy of debt crisis of 1980s, the improved profitability of investment in developed 
countries, the integration of European economies and market liberalization of Eastern 
Europe have increased the opportunity cost of investing in developing countries 
(Chhibber, Dailami and Shafik, 1992). Given these facts, it is difficult and unlikely to 
attract foreign investment in the absence of a strong revival of indigenous private 
investors in these countries. 
Faced with the global economic reality, a large number of countries have undertaken 
comprehensive economic measures such as macroeconomic and structural adjustments 
in the recent years. However, as explained by Dani Rodrik (1989) in his cross-sectional 
empirical analysis of policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries, 
the private investment response to the reforms has so far been disappointing. Despite 
painful comprehensive reforms pursued by developing countries, capital flight has 
continued and only a few countries have managed what businessmen call “ desired 
investment climate”. One important reason is the high degree of uncertainty regarding 
future policy.  
 
The prevalence of uncertainty of this sort creates a dilemma. For policy reform to be 
successful, entrepreneurs, workers, and farmers have to respond to the signal 
generated by the reform (Greene and Villanuva). For example, out ward – oriented 
exchange rate and trade policies can serve their purpose only if the desired export 
response materializes. On the other hand, because physical investment is partly 
irreversible, the rational behaviour by private sector calls for withholding investment 
until much of the residual uncertainty regarding the successes of the reforms is 
eliminated. Knowing the factors that determine or/ and affect the response of private 
investment is significantly important for policy makers to encourage private investment.  
 
The investment behaviour goes back to Keynes’ (1936) “ General Theory” who first 
called attention to the existence of an independent investment decision function in the 
economy. He observed that investment depends on the prospective marginal efficiency 
of capital relative to some interest rate that is reflective of opportunity cost of the 
investment funds. After Keynes, the accelerator principle was the dominant theory of 
investment behaviour especially during the 1950’s and early 1960s.The accelerator 
theory postulates a linear relationship between investment and output. According to the 
theory, given an incremental capital/ output ratio, it is easy to compute the investment 
requirements associated with a given target of output growth. Hence there is a constant 
ratio of desired capital stock to output. This theory has been criticized by its different 
limitations. The theory does not consider investors’ expectations, profitability, and the 
cost of capital as determinant of investment behaviour. To capture these limitations the 
theory. Jorgenson (1967) and Hall and Jorgenson (1971) have designed the flexible 
accelerator model based on the optimal accumulation of the capital. They assumed that 
investment is the function of the level of output and the user cost of capital (which in 
turn depends on the price of capital goods, the real interest rate and the depreciation 
rate). This theory has again other drawback by its underlying assumption of perfect 
competition which disregarded /over looked the role of dynamic expectations of 
investors behaviour regarding the future prices, interest rate and output.  
 
 In 1969 Tobin had come with the postulate that investment decisions are a function of 
the ratio of the addition to the value of the form due to an extra unit of capital installed 
to its replacement cost. This ratio Tobin’s q, when it is greater (less) than units, firms 
would want to increase (decrease) their capital stock. As a result of poor empirical 
performance of flexible and Tobin’s q theory, particularly for developing countries, 
most researchers have used more of eclectic model of the private investment designed 
to capture the distinctive institutional and structural features of these developing 
economies. They have combined the features of flexible accelerator, Neoclassical and 
structural models in an effort to capture the effects of resource constraints, investment 
irreversibility, and uncertainty to measure the political and country risk.  
 The latter branch of the literature is especially designed to capture the determinants of 
private investment in developing countries, because, it intended to capture some 
macroeconomic variables, or institutional features that are specific to developing 
countries. These specific features to the developing countries are highly vulnerable to 
the world economic shock, large external debt stock, resource constraint, and the role 
of government in the economy and the level of development and the deepening of 
financial and capital markets. However, some neoclassical adherents argue that the 
inclusions of such variables have been resulted in eclectic and ad hoc, with out strong 
and convincing theoretical basis (Jorgensen, 1969). All these show the attempts made 
by researchers to improve the theoretical basis of the macroeconomic determinants of 
private investment in developing countries.     
 
Theoretical models of the determinants of private investment have been applied to the 
developed countries with a faire degree of success (Bischoff 1969, Clark 1979). 
Nevertheless, empirical studies have not yet clarified which of these models is a more 
accurate representation of the way in which capital formation occurred in developed 
countries. This is more true for developing countries where the assumptions underlying 
the standard optimising investment models are usually not applicable.  
 
Empirical studies on the determinants of private investment in developing countries 
have been few and rudimentary. Most of them have used a much more eclectic model of 
private investment designed to capture the distinctive institutional and structural 
features of those economies. They have combined the features of the flexible 
accelerator, Neoclassical and structural models in an effort to emphasize the effects of 
resource constraints faced by private investors in developing countries. The results of 
those studies suggest that expected aggregate demand measured indirectly by out put, 
domestic credit constraints proxied by credit availability to private sectors, real 
exchange rate and physical infrastructure proxied by public investment expenditure are 
important determinants of private investment in developing countries (Sundrajan and 
Thaku 1980, Tunwai and Wong 1982, Blejer and Khan 1984). Policy reforms and 
institutional adjustments affect private investment because they affect those 
determinants. 
 
3.1 DETERMINANTS OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES ON DOMESTIC 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT  
 Macroeconomic policies may affect economic growth either directly through their effect 
on the accumulation of factors of production or indirectly through their impact on 
efficiency with which factors of production are used (Deane, 1983). Macroeconomic 
stability is important signals to the private sector about the direction of economic 
policies and the credibility of the authorities’ commitment to manage the economy 
efficiently. Such stability by facilitating long-term planning and investment decisions 
encourages savings and private capital accumulation (Michael, Ghura, Martin, Roger 
and Ucer, 1995). 
   
                        3.1.1. Output Growth and Private Investment 
Studies of private investment behaviour have shown that private investment responds 
strongly to fluctuations to output (Blejer and Khan 1984, Greene and Villanuena 1990). 
Recessionary developments triggered by demand management policies generally 
contribute to pessimistic expectations. The interrelationships between investment and 
output are complex, they work in both directions in the sense that a higher demand for 
goods and services generate both for new and replacement investment (what economists 
call the accelerator mechanism) while, further investment, in turn, provides the potential 
for more economic growth (the multiplier process). Private investment has been 
hypothesized as a positive function of income per capita because of the greater ability of 
higher income countries to devote resources to savings. This ability is particularly 
important given the imperfection of capital markets in developing countries. Thus, most 
investment projects must be financed at least in substantial part, through domestic 
savings (Greene and Villaneuva, 1990). Economic recessions triggered through demand 
management policies lead investors to postpone investment until recovery takes place. 
There is also fear that such waiting may prevent the take-off investment, especially for 
the projects of a short gestation period it often delays recovery itself, and therefore, the 
economy might get trapped in a low investment equilibrium  (Serven and Solimano, 
1989). 
             
                                  3.1.2    Domestic Inflation Rate  
Beside the factor derived from the neoclassical investment model, the domestic inflation 
rate affects private investment growth rate. Macroeconomic stability such as low and 
predicable inflation is strong signal to ensure a strong response of private investment to 
economic investors. The direction of the effects of inflation on savings, investment and 
growth is ambiguous in the theoretical literature. According to the Tobin, Mundell 
effect, higher anticipated inflation leads to lower interest rate and cause portfolio 
adjustments away from real money balance to wards real capitals, hence a higher 
inflation would be expected to lead to higher real investment and faster growth. 
However, in the case of developing countries with under developing domestic capital 
and financial markets, the portfolio adjustment would most likely be from real money 
balance to real assets (e.g. land, live stock, jewelleries, and consumer durable). Which 
are not usually included in private investment, or denominated in foreign currency 
through capital fight. Thus higher anticipated inflation in developing countries would be 
expected to lower private investment. Also in the context of developing countries, 
inflation may serve as an indicator to the credibility of the authorities commitment to 
stable macroeconomic environment. The presence of high and variable inflation rate 
would be expected to lower the credibility of the authorities visa a-vis the private sector 
and reduces the return on private savings and investment. Thus, high rats of inflation 
would be expected to lower private investment.  
  
Further more, when the rate of inflation, is highly variable, the extraction of the correct 
signals from relative price movements are rather difficult task and can lead to an 
inefficient allocation of economic resources, including capital. There is a number of 
transmission mechanism of the effects of inflation on investment and hence growth.  In 
the cash - in advance models (e.g. stockman. (1981), anticipated inflation, by raising the 
cost of capital accumulation, there by lowering economic growth. In this model an 
increase in inflation induces firms to economize in real money balances, thus raising 
transaction costs and the value of capital. The resulting increase in the price of capital 
goods, leads to a reduction in the rate of investment, which in turn reduces capital 
accumulation and growth.  
 
Another effects of increasing inflation raise inflation tax and hence lower the incentive 
to work. Since the productivity is supposed to depend on the employment, a fall in 
employment leads to a reduction in growth. Also Fischer (19930 has noted that “ the 
inflation rate serves as an indicator of the over all ability of the government to manage 
the economy”.  
               
                       3.1.3 The Foreign Exchange Constraint  
Another key factor determining private investment is the access to international markets. 
As developing countries’ investments have under taken by importing capital goods, it is 
supposed that most developing countries are subjected to foreign exchange constraints. 
Indeed, this was the origin of debt crisis and again the central focus of the adjustment 
policies. In consequence, there is a real limit on import capacity, resulting from foreign 
exchange shortfalls which are in turn caused by inelastic export supply, exogenous 
fluctuations in export prices, external credit rationing by international financial 
institutions and exogenous rise in interest rates on the outstanding debt (for details, see 
Fitzgerad, Jansen and Vos, 1992). This is the likely that for most developing countries, 
private investment will be highly responsive to import capacity.   
                           
                                   3.1.4 Interest Rate and Credit Availability 
The user cost of capital is an important factor in investment decisions by the private 
sector. When the user cost is generally raised by increasing the cost of bank credit 
through raising interest rate or by increasing the opportunity cost of retained earnings, 
which is the other main source of investment financing, private investment declines 
(Jayaraman, 1996). Findings of various empirical studies are not, however, consistent. 
The negative influence of interest rates on investment is confirmed by certain studies in 
developing countries (Greene and Villaneuva, 1991, Solimano1992). However, studies 
by others (Serven and Solimano 1985) have shown that, in the repressed financial 
markets in developing countries, credit policy affects investment directly through the 
stock of credit available to firms with the access to preferential interest rates, rather than 
through the interest channel). Thus institutional set up of the financial markets is an 
important factor for the transmission mechanism of the impact of monetary policy and 
credit policies on private investment. 
However, a clear consensus has emerged in recent years that, in contrast to developing 
countries, one of the principal constraints on investment in developing countries is the 
quantity, rather than the cost of credit. The rates of return on investment in developing 
countries are assumed to be quite high, whereas real interest rates in these countries 
deliberately repressed for the variety of reasons. In such imperfect financial markets, the 
investor is not expected to equate the current marginal product of capital to its service 
cost (Serven and Solimano, 1985). Indeed, because the total amount of financing is 
limited and the price mechanism is not allowed to operate freely, it is logical to argue 
that the level of available bank credit generally restricts the private investment in 
developing countries. An increase in real credit to the private sector encourages real 
private investment as is confirmed by several empirical studies (Fry 1980, Tybout 1984, 
Blejer and Khan 1984). Thus, institutional set-up of the financial markets is an 
important factor for monetary policy and credit policies to have significant important on 
private investment.        
                  3.1.5 Public Sector Investment and Private Sector 
Fiscal policy affects private investment through budgetary imbalances (Matin and 
Wasow 1992). Persistent physical deficits either push interest rates higher or reduce the 
stock of credit available to the private investment. According to the empirical studies of 
Jayaraman cross-country analysis of six South Pacific Island countries, a reduction of 
budgetary deficits or running surplus has found to be encouraging private investment. 
Another empirical works on developing countries by Khan and Reinhart (1989) has 
shown that, at the best, public sector investment in developing countries has no 
significant effect on private investment. Findings of various empirical studies on the 
relationship between public and private investment have, however, been conflicting. 
While some say, for instance, Balassa’s cross-sectional study (Balassa, 1989) has shown 
that there exists a negative relationship between the two, Greene and Villanueva (1990), 
have found a positive association between public and private investments in their cross-
sectional study of 23 countries.  
 
Many empirical researches have discovered that public investment that is related to the 
development of infrastructure and the provision of public goods is complementary to 
private investment. Public investment of this type can enhance the profitability of 
private investment and therefore, raise the productivity of capital. It also increases the 
demand for private output and augments over all resource availability by expanding 
aggregate out put and savings (Khan and Reinhart, 1989). In their empirical analysis of 
Kenyan economy, Matin and Wasow (1992) also found the positive relationship 
between public investment on infrastructure and private investment. In addition, they 
found that the failure of controlling current expenditures adversely affected the 
resources that could have gone to public investment in infrastructure, which would have 
enhanced private investment productivity.  
 
3.1.6 Exchange Rate Policy 
Exchange rate management has clear implications for private investment. To correct the 
external imbalances from time to time, a real depreciation of domestic currency has 
been restored by developing countries under adjustment programs. In the empirical 
researches by Dornbush in1988, Serven in1990, Serven and Solimano in 1993 have 
identified three main channels through which a real depreciation can affect private 
investment. They are the real cost of capital goods, real interest rate and real output. 
A real depreciation leads to a rise in the import cost of capital, and thus, leads to 
contraction of non-tradable activities. The higher is the dependency on the imported 
capital and intermediate goods and the lower is the proportion of tradable goods sector 
in the countries total economic activities, the greater will be the adverse impact of real 
depreciation on the level of the private investment (Jayaraman, 1996). In the case of 
unanticipated devaluation as well as in the case of interest rates being determined by 
market forces, a devaluation of the currency raises the price level through a rise in the 
cost of imported capital and intermediate goods and put wage indexation under pressure 
(Krugman, 1997). In these circumstances given the amount of money supply, real 
money balance will fall leading to an increase in interest rates. An increase in interest 
rates will decrease investment, the extent of the decrease being determined by the 
interest elasticity of demand for investment (Dornbush, Fischer and Startz, 1998).  
 
Devaluation affects the output level by influencing the aggregate demand. Theoretical 
literatures and empirical studies tell us that the impact of real depreciation in the short-
run will result in the contraction of demand. Accordingly, aggregate demand will be 
reduced. Chhibber and Shafik (1992) made empirical analyses of the impact of 
devaluation on Indonesian economy. They have found that devaluation in the short-run 
has adverse supply-side effects that lead to an output contraction through increased real 
costs. As a result, they found the effects of devaluation in Indonesia are contractionary 
and private investment fell in the short-run.  
However, most of the literatures on both theoretical and empirical studies agree that, in 
the mid and long-term, if devaluation significantly increases the profitability of exports 
and thus, the volume of net export, it is likely to increase output and private investment 
as well. The supporting measures, needed to sustain for the positive medium and long-
effects of devaluation, are strong commitment to end uncertainties. 
3.2   Evidences From Some Previous Empirical Studies 
 
Blejer and khan (1984) examined the impact of government economic policy on private 
investment in some 24 developing countries. The study found that the level of private 
investment activity was related positively to change in expected real GDP, the 
availability of fund to private investment (measured by change in bank credit in private 
sector and the level of private capital in flow and public investment. In addition, the 
empirical results also showed that private investment was negatively related to excess 
productive capacity. The finding on the relation between public investment and private 
investment suggests that there is a long run complementary of private and public 
investment, but there is a sign of substitutability in the short-run. This is to mean in the 
short-run public investment increase tends to crowd-out private investment activity. 
 
Greane and Villanuera (1991) have conducted empirical study of factors determining 
private investment on 23 countries. The hypothesized factors to determine private 
investment and included in the empirical analysis are real GDP, real interest rates, 
domestic inflation, the debt services ratio and the ratio of debt to GDP. The study has 
found that except real GDP, the remaining factors were negatively related with private 
investment. 
 
Tun Wai and Choung-Huey Wong (1982) studied determinants of private investment in 
developing countries using modified version of flexible accelerator theory of investment 
with particular reference to developing countries, which are five in number. Separate 
equations for each country using the ordinary least square were estimated. The results 
show that the coefficient of government intervention, change in bank credit to private 
sector, private sector out put and net capital inflow to private sector are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign (positive). 
 
Matin and Wasow (1992) studied factors contributed to low level of private investment 
in Kenya, particularly after the coffee export boom in 1970s and the break up of East 
African Common Market. The study found out that declining availability of credit to 
private sector, falling stock of infrastructure capital and the relatively low level of 
foreign reserve allocation to import relative to 1970s were the main factors behind the 
decline in the rate of private investment in the 1980s in Kenya. 
 
Most of the empirical literature review mentioned above had used panel data, since 
panel data have their own limitations in the sense that they suffer from heterogeneity 
bias.  Another thing is unfortunately Ethiopia did not include in these panel data (cross-
sectional), studies I came through regarding private investment. 
 
However, same home studies, I have seen, are limited in coverage, particularly on the 
recent private sector performance analysing with macroeconomic variables.  This 
study try to cover two distinct periods which are both in ideology and in their 
development policy orientation are virtual different.  The period under empirical study 
covered from 1975-1998.  The period spanning 1975 to 1991 was the socialist, the so-
called "Dreg Regime" and the remaining period covering 1992-1998 has been the period 
with dramatic change both in ideology and economic development policy orientation. 
The later period is the particular interest of this study if the private sector responded to 
this policy change which would have given due emphasis on the role of the private 
sector in the economy at least on policy orientation.  The analysis used both the 
development trends in private sector and rigorous econometric regression using 
macroeconomic variables covering the period under study. 
IV. Trends in Private investment in Ethiopia (1975   - 
1998) 
                       4.1The Derg Regime  (1975  
- 1991) 
It seems a promising event, When the Revolution broke out in 1974. The military group 
that suddenly took power out of the hands of the Emperor, looks realized the underlying 
economic problems of its predecessors and terminated the feudal relation of production, 
which was widely recognized impediment to economic development in Ethiopia.  
 
This definitely a relief to the majority of the rural poor through the proclamation of 
“rural land to the tiller”. This put the country one step further to wards equality 
particularly among the rural people. However, the over all objective of the development 
of the military government was to build socialist society, Marxism - Leninism was being 
the guiding ideology and central planning the main instrument of economic 
transformation.  
 
 
By means of proclamation No. 26/1975 (the nationalization proclamation), large number 
of private businesses and properties were nationalized. Proclamation No - 76/1975 
issued at the same time restricting private sector operation to a few lines of activities 
and imposed capital ceilings on them. Only individual business was allowed (with out 
branches) and private business could possibly organize them selves in the form of 
partnership and the membership was restricted to 5 persons. 
 
Joint Ventures were allowed by the proclamation No- 235/1983 but only gave the right 
for the government and foreign investors, with the major share of the government. 
However, only few joint Ventures were realized over the years those were six, out of 
which two were liquidated (Melaku Tefera, 1989). Recognizing the over all crisis of the 
economy and the world situation at a time and the intensified internal instability forced 
the military government to change policy course, announce the so called "Mixed 
Economy" in 1989. The change of the policy course had did no more than the 
proclamation due to the short life of the Derg on the power  
 
 
 
 3.1.2 Performance of the Private Sector (Derg) (1975 – 
1991) 
 
As the policy was so much restrictive and marginalized the private sector, it is not 
surprising that if the least figures have witnessed from the table as compared with 
private investment ratio with the average for Sub -Saharan African countries during the 
same period. During the same period, the average investment ratio for Sub - Saharan 
African countries excluding South Africa was about 10% of GDP, while that of Ethiopia 
was on average over the period (1975 – 1991) 2.4 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, 
public investment to GDP had an increasing trend particularly during the time of the 
intensification of the establishment of the state – owned enterprises,  
Except the last three years. Presumably, the deceleration of public investment after 
1989 was due to the effect of policy change. 
Table 4.1 Ethiopia and SSACs Private Investment rate as percentage of GDP (1986 – 
1998)   
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 199
Ethiopi
a 
2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.8 6.0 6.4 5.8 8.5 9.6 10.9 11.
SSACs 8.2 10.8 11.9 11.5 12.8 12.3 12.4 11.8 12.4 12.8 11.7 12.8 10.
Source:  - For Ethiopia – Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation   
               - For SSACs – Economic trends in Africa database, August 1998.  
 
4.2 Development of post- 1991 Reform: - 
                 4.2  Towards Decentralized Market- Driven Economy 
             4.2.1   Investment Policy and Incentives 
 
The first significant move of the new government was the launching of the economic 
policy of the TGE, in 1991, the central elements were the greater scope it gave to the 
market mechanism governing the economy, the emphasis it placed on Federalism (TGE, 
1991). The overall policy frame work of the TGE and the specific measures after wards 
largely aimed at the private sector for its proper role in economic activities, and to 
compress the role of the state to strategic activities (providing infrastructure and 
promote social development) and hence to create an enabling and conducive 
environment for private sector. 
 
In order to materialize the intention of putting the private sector a leading in the 
economy, Proclamation No.15/1992 was promulgated in May 1992. The proclamation 
was a complete departure from the previous regimes' special investment decree 
No.17/1990 and joint venture special decree No.11/1989. The new promulgated 
investment proclamation has created good investment environment particularly for 
domestic investors, which allows the participation in Air Transport, Electricity 
production and distribution, Banking and Insurance. 
 
After exercising proclamation No15/1992 for about four years, a new proclamation No. 
37/1996 was promulgated in July 1996 to amend some weak points of the proclamation 
No. 15/1992. The proclamation No. 37/1996 gave more emphasis on the clarity of some 
ambiguities prevailed in the first one. 
 
With regard to institution to implement investment policy and incentives, Investment 
Office of Ethiopia which then renamed Investment Authority of Ethiopia (IAE) was 
established. The authority is accountable for Investment Board, which chaired by Prime 
Minister. The responsibility of investment authority of Ethiopia (IAE); process 
investment application, i.e., issue investment certificates and grant investment 
incentives as per provided in proclamation. The IAE responsible for investors with and 
above capital of Birr 250,000(for domestic investors) and USD 500,000 or equivalent 
for foreign investors1. If any investor did not happy by the decision of IAE, the investor 
can appeal to Investment Board. The decision of the Board is the final. A great process 
has been made with respect to the institutional arrangement from the previous regime. 
Previously the investor goes to respective ministries to get temporary license and for 
acquisition of investment incentives to the office of investment. Now the investor goes 
to only IAE to get both investment certificate and incentives. 
 
There are two types of investment rules in Ethiopia.  These are the Federal investment 
policy and the regional states investment regulations.  The Federal Investment policy 
under the proclamation no. 37/1996 aimed at improving the living standard of the people 
of Ethiopia by bringing sustainable economic and social development (FDRE, 1996a).  It 
was aimed at accelerating, economic development putting the private sector at the 
centre of which is supposed enable efficient utilization of natural resources which then 
reinforced by competitive environment and thus create wide employment opportunity. 
 
The country after the socialist regime has been leading on the principle democratic 
decentralization on the basis of Federalism, Consisting of nine regional states. (Tigray, 
Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, Benishangul & Gumuz, SNNP, Gambella, Harrari.) And 
two administrations (Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa).  Therefore, one of the objective of 
federalism is to encourage balanced development and integrated economic activity 
among the regions and to strengthen the inter - sectoral linkages of the economy 
(FDRE, 1996a).  In fact the policy makes special discrimination in the provision of 
incentives particularly tax exemption.  The investment incentive council of Ministers 
(Regulation no. 7/19/96) provides various incentives (tax holidays, and import duty free) 
based on geographical, capital structural and sectoral criteria.  In terms of geographical 
criteria it was indicated that (FDRE, 19966)  
 
Where the investment is in Addis Ababa, Nazareth or in a locality with in a 
radius of 15 km of the main high ways connecting the two cities, the period of 
tax exemption shall be for one year.  Where the investment is relatively under 
developed regions such as Gamblella, Benishangul & Gumuz, SouthOmo, Certain 
Zones in Afar, Somali and other regions to be determined by the board, the 
period of exemption shall be for 3 years (FDRE, 1996a). 
 
While the above tax holidays applies for promoted activities the tax holidays for pioneer 
activities are 3 years for the city of Addis Ababa and the surroundings while for 
underdeveloped regions this goes the 5 years and this is given to be 4 years for other 
locations.  
 
                Table 4.2          Tax Holidays by Locations 
Location Type of investment 
activities 
Tax holidays (in years) 
Addis Ababa, Nazreth and    
In location with in 15 km of the Pioneer 3 
Main high way connecting two cities. Promoted 1 
Relatively underdeveloped locations: -
Benishnagul & Gumuz, Gambella, 
South Omo, other regions which will 
be determined 
 
 
Pioneer 
 
 
5 
by the investment board Promoted 3 
All other locations Pioneer 4 
 Promoted 2 
Source: - Ethiopian investment Authority, 1998. 
 
While the above incentive policy is clearly biased towards the less developed regions 
and it aims to discourage development in already developed regions, the extent to which 
such policy has attracted investment to wards the less developed regions is a matter for 
study.  To see the extent of this policy using some figures obtained from EIA, these 
figures show that the incentive policy could not achieve its stated goal of attracting 
investment to the less developed regions.  
Table 4.3 shows that the relatively well-developed regions of Oromia, Addis Ababa, 
Tigray and Amhara lead investment attraction.  Benishangul and Afar still lack the 
supposed investment attraction as intended to be. 
Approved Project of Private investment in National /Regional states/ Administrations 
(1993 – 1999) 
Table 4.3               
(In Million Birr) 
        
Region 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 69/97 97/98 98/99 
Tigray 1121.83 
(12) 
313.19 
(24) 
1329.20(1
48)
368.87
(146)
174.47
(19)
353.20 
(380 
153.23
(25)
Afar 44.52 
(1) 
500.80 
(13) 
320.23
(21)
229.27
(29)
- 304.08 
(190 
283.40
(6)
Amhara 32.97 
(22) 
198.16 
(32) 
190.43
(73)
825.91
(123)
2467.43
(62)
288.27 
(59) 
200.3
(40)
Oromia 113.59 
(43) 
364.19 
(101) 
563.06
(150)
1493.36
(273)
989.25
(204)
2663.045 
(307) 
1463.045
(98)
Somali 102.00 
(1) 
- - 6.64
(4)
119.19
(5)
20.40 
(6) 
19.95
(5)
Benishangul 
& Gumuz 
- 34.01 
(1) 
44.46
(5)
195.45
(21)
88.36
(10)
35.6 
(6) 
17.8
(3)
SNNP 34.26 
(9) 
249.68 
(20) 
227.77
(46)
334.56
(76)
505.01
(161)
1108. 38 
(200) 
554.19
(132)
Gambella 18.95 
(1) 
2.39 
(1) 
0.29
(1)
4.37
(3)
2.36
(2)
8.54 
(4) 
4.27
(2)
Harari - 72.75 
(2) 
209.16
(40)
52.52
(21)
29.82
(5)
240.2 
(50) 
46.8
(14)
Addis Ababa 2468.57 
(459) 
2166.14 
(360) 
1818.80
(199)
3342.67
(220)
3265.98
(277)
3033.2 
(310) 
1516.6
(155)
Dire Dawa 3.28 
(11) 
11.67 
(3) 
8.86
(8)
36.79
(12)
81.69
(27)
- -
Total 3940 
(549) 
3913. 
(557) 
4712.3
(691)
6908.8
(931)
7623.6
(792)
- -
Source: IEA, 1999 
Note: - Numbers in parenthesis show number of projects, otherwise amount of planned 
capital. 
 
This perhaps indicates that generous investment incentives through investment policy 
alone in the form of tax holidays and others are not enough to influence the inflow of 
private investors to the target regions.  Here, though the other main factors supposed 
to influence investment distribution is beyond this study, factors perceived to be 
influenced are infrastructure, investment implementation procedures (beaurocracies), 
capable human resource in respective regions and the certainty of policy environment 
presumably determining factors, however. 
 
Other thing noteworthy to mention is, the different regional investment regulations are 
formulated from the Federal Investment Policy in their content.  Regions are largely 
different in their investment opportunity however.  These different sectoral 
compositions and opportunities should be specifically reflected in different regional 
states investment regulations.  The sectoral priority of one region may be different 
from the other regional priority. For instance, regions with high livestock potential 
should be able to give more emphasis to promote livestock development.  Other region 
may has tourist potential, this region too, should give due emphasis in promoting this 
sector. 
 
Regions have developed institutional structures to implement investment policy and 
have provided some rules regarding the rural and urban land for investment purposes.  
The following discusses the case of Oromia regional state which is geographically at 
the centre of the country and relatively wide in land coverage and natural resource 
endowed.  This regional state has twelve provinces which vary relatively in 
development level.  The region established investment promotion organs in hierarchical 
order.  These are Oromia investment beauru accountable for Investment Board, Zonal 
and district committee. The Regional Investment Beauru is responsible for the day-to-
day activities of investment through Zonal and District Investment Committee in the 
region. 
 
Among the investment promotion incentives, the provision of rural land is as one the 
area of investment promotion.  The investment proclamation no. 31/ 1995 provides for 
the use of rural land of investment in the Oromia Region indicates that land will be given 
on priority bases to projects falling in the category of activities identified to the top 
priority in the region or those considered having high social return.  Those activities 
which affect the rights of the peasantry and peasant holdings and those that require 
land which are designated for the development of natural resources, religious sites or 
public services will not be granted for the investment operation. The size of land 
holding to be granted for investment depends on the nature of the project and the 
amount of capital assigned for it.  Land is given on a lease contract terms for a period 
more than thirty years.  The lease rate for the land made to vary from Zone to Zone 
according to the distance from all Weather roads and the existing development level 
with in the zones.  Hence zones such as East Shoa, West Shoa, and Arsi Which are 
ranked first as per this criteria have the highest lease rate per hector while zones such 
as Illubabor, Borena and West Wollega which are ranked least have the lowest lease 
rate per hectar (see table 4.3).  The rate discriminates in favour of remote and under 
developed zones and which again differ with in the zone.  The intention of such policy 
is to attract investment to less developed areas with in the region.  In terms of 
investment types, those investment which are believed to contribute to the environment 
protection and public services will be give land free of charge.  The proclamation also 
gives the night of holding upon requested for the above mentioned purpose by full filling 
the requirement on the side of the private investor, land will be given/transferred/ to 
the investor within fifteen days from the signing of the contract. 
 
The performance and distribution of investment, however, does not confirm the 
intention provided by the proclamation.  The participation and distribution of the 
private investors far from intention of the promotion of balanced development among 
zones. 
 Table 4.4   Floor Rate for Rural Land Investment (Birr/Hector) 
Rank  Zone Distance from Main all weather road (in Kilometre) 
1st East Shoa 
West Shoa 
Arsi 
 
135 
 
129.60 
 
124.42 
 
119.44 
 
114.66 
2nd Jimma 
North Shoa 
East Hararghe 
 
114.75 
 
110.16 
 
105.75 
 
101.52 
 
97.46 
3rd East Wollega 
West Wollega 
Bale 
 
97.54 
 
93.64 
 
89.89 
 
86.29 
 
82.83 
4th Illubabor 
Borena 
West Wollega 
 
82.91 
 
79.59 
 
76.41 
 
73.35 
 
70.40 
Source: - Oromia Regional Government Council (1995) proclamation no. 31/1995  
In terms of the performance of investment, during the period of July 1992 to May 
9,2000 the number of projects, which have received license to operate in the Oromia 
region, were 1216 of which only 401 projects (33%) of the total have started production 
or service. Above 17.5 percent have reported to be under implementation while not 
much is known about the remaining 350 percent of the projects.  This obviously 
indicates that beyond the regional investment policy or the incentive system there are 
some factors, which deterred investors to materialize their planned investment.  The 
reasons as to why low rate of implementation of the projects in the region are; 
administrative procedures, some ambiguity on the regulation of investment incentive by 
bottom executing groups and rural land lease rate unclarity, however, are among widely 
claimed to be problems in the region. 
 
In terms of the distribution of investment in the region there is a clear bias towards the 
more developed zones of the region (table 4.4). East and west Shoa are the ones with 
the highest amount of investment projects.  Borena and Illubabor are among those, 
which have small number of projects.  East Harerghe with only 2 private investment 
projects is the one with the lowest number. 
 
Table 4.5 Types of Approved Projects, Operational and Implementation Number, 
Investment Capital and Employment Creation of Domestic Investment projects, by type 
in Oromia Region. (July 1992 – July 2000) 
Type No. Of 
project 
Investment) Employment Creation 
  Capital (Mill.Birr) Permanent Temporary 
Approved 1,168 5,273.49 47,435 5,827 
Operation 394 1,344.99 14435 4,127 
Implementation 498 1,122.02 7,395 186 
Operation as % 
Approved 
33.73 25.5 30.43 70.82 
Implementation 
as % Approved 
16.95 21.28 15.59 3.19 
Source: - EIA, Annual Investment Statistics Bulletin, 1999. 
 
Table 4.6    Zonal Distribution of Licensed Private Investment  
 Agricultu
re 
Industr
y 
Hotel Social 
Servic
e 
Const
ructio
n 
Trad
e 
Rura
l 
estat
e 
Mining Transp
ort 
Total 
East Shoa 117 94 24 6 2 8 3 1 2 259 
West Shoa 107 49 7 - - 1 - - 2 169 
North Shoa 17 5 3 - - - - - - 25 
West Shoa 13 5 - - - - - - - 18 
East Harerghe 2 - - - - - - - - 2 
East Wollega 14 - - - - 2 - - - 16 
West Wollega 15 22 1 -- - - - 1 - 39 
Jimma 21 39 2 1 - - 1 - - 64 
Arsi 48 6 1 1 1 1 - - - 57 
Bale 9 4 - - - - - - 2 13 
Borena 3 34 1 - 3 - - - - 38 
Illubabor 8 12 - - - -  - - 23 
Different 
Zones 
40 - - - -  - - - 40 
Source: - Oromia Statistical information, 1998. 
 
          4.2.2 Performance of Private Investment Post-1992 ERP  
Perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of Economic Reform Program Process looks to be 
the response of the private sector. In spite of the various measures and gradual 
amendment of investment proclamation has been undertaken to further encourage 
private sector, the supply response of the private sector is far from the satisfactory as 
to be intended in he program. The case is more serious when it comes to 
materialisation of licensed projects. 
 
Different literatures have forwarded different suggestions evidencing more of 
qualitative reasons with little empirical or quantitative seasonings.  Contributing 
factors among the suggested impediments can be seen in to two aspects.  Firstly, from 
investors aspect; investors in Ethiopia had been marginalized from economic activities 
for years, so that they have the impression that if the newly changed investment 
environment is that much credible and to sustain.  In addition, the irreversibility of 
investment behaviour which entails that any investor rationally think that postponding 
(waiting) investment activities till the uncertainty residuals are removed is the expected 
behaviour for short period of time. Secondly, the institutional, infrastructures and 
resource constraints are the outstanding  
Obscures that slowed down the pace of real rate of investment in Ethiopia 
Table 4.7 Number, Investment Capital and Employment Creation of approved, 
Terminated and inactive Investment projects by Sector (June, 1992 – January 2000). 
(Investment Capital in million Birr)   
Sector  Total Approved Terminated 
projects 
Inactive 
projects No. Of 
Proj. 
Investment 
Capital 
Employment Creation 
Permanent Temporary 
Primary Sector 1,362 7,464.68 53,943 509,053 38 11 
Secondary 
Sector 
2,413 17,817.56 103,510 25,400 32 150 
Tertiary Sector 1674 32,481.09 106,652 23,312 20 200 
Grand Total 5,369 57,763.33 264,105 557,765          90 361 
Source: Ethiopia Investment Authority, January 2000 
 
However, Whatever, the reasons for forwarded for weak response of the private sector, 
the figures regarding the intended plan investments are impressive, since the number of 
newly licensed projects have been increased enormously. For instance, since July 1992 
up to January, 2000; 5369 projects have got permits (investment licenses), out of which 
1,324 projects are in primary sector (Agriculture and Allied activities), with intended 
planned capital of 7,094.65 and are expected to create employment both permanent and 
temporary 50,007 and 429,152 people respectively.  The remaining projects are 
categorized as secondary sector (industrial sector) and Tertiary sector (All service 
sector) 2,381 and 1.664 projects with planned capital investment of Birr 17,521.28 and 
32,166.83 respectively.  As to employment creation the two sectors are expected to 
generate job opportunity for about 206940 permanent and 486.29 temporary. 
Beginning the promulgation of investment proclamation no. 15/1992 projects whose 
their licenses were terminated (either cancelled by EIA or returned by investors 
themselves) are 90 projects (38 from primary, 32 from secondary. and 20 from territory 
sectors).  While since 1992/93 those projects approved and did not yet start any 
activity and categorized by the authority as in active projects are 361(11 from primary, 
150 from secondary and 200 from territory) (See table). 
Table 4.8       Number of projects by the ownership. 
Description Total Domestic Foreign 
No.of Invest.
 Employment 
Proje. Capital   permanent   
Temporary 
No. Of  Investment     Employm
Projects Capital 
Approved  5369 5144 35,989.
73 
227,06
1 
432,690 205 10,201.
14 
30947 
Operation 1517 1470 6330.81 52212 267390 45 3,541.4
6 
16,907 
Implementati
on 
1,02
3 
954 7264.05 40,044 29,787 63 4,217.6
6 
14,040 
% To 
approved  
 
     
Operation 
 
  
Implementati
on   
 
 
28.2
5 
 
 
19.0
5 
 
 
28.5
8 
 
 
18.5
5 
 
 
17.59 
 
 
20.18 
 
 
22.99 
 
 
17.64 
 
 
61.80 
 
6.88 
 
 
21.95
 
 
30.73
 
 
34.72 
 
 
41.34 
 
 
32.07 
 
 
31.48 
Source: Ethiopia Investment Authority  
 
Among 5368 projects which have got permits since July, 1992 to January, 2000, 5144 
projects are owned by domestic investors and the remaining 205 projects are either 
wholly owned by foreign or joint venture.  In terms of planned investment capital, 
domestic projects amounts 35,989.73 billion Birr while foreign capital on approved 
projects is 10,201.14 billion Birr.  From the same table ---, one interesting figures can 
be observed.  Among the projects that have been given investment certificates, just 
over 28 percent have been commenced operation and 18 per have started 
implementation for domestic projects.  As to employment creation, the total approved 
domestic projects are supposed to create job opportunity for about 227,061 permanent 
job and 432,690 temporary jobs.  However, as low the real rate of investment put in to 
either operation or implementation, it has been possible to create job opportunity only 
for 52212 and 267,390 people permanently and temporarily respectively.  While on the 
other hand, projects under implementation have created job opportunity both for 
permanent and temporary for about 954 and 7,264.05 people respectively. 
 
Secondly, the sectoral and regional distributed of these projects is highly skewed (See 
Appendix table…). Most t of the projects under implementation is in manufacturing and 
agriculture, and is mainly located in the capital.  Even with in manufacturing, it seems 
to concentrate around the traditionally dominant sub-sectors such as food and 
beverages, which does not seem to change the existing structure of the sector.  It is 
also believed that the reform process is in large part in favour of large-scale 
enterprises, to the determent of the small and medium ones (Taye, 1996). Moreover, 
the inclination of the planned investment appears to be towards the domestic market 
rather than export.  This situation needs to be given due attention so that the economy 
would move with a balanced pace in all sectors and in all regions. 
 
According to recent studies made on the impact of Economic Reform Program on the 
performance of private sector, though licensed projected are very much impressive real 
investment rates were not as intended.  These studies claimed practical policy 
implementation as obscures than the investment policy itself.  Different recent 
literatures on post-reform impact analysis on the economy in general, private sector in 
particular, would agree, if not all, that investment policy has created good investment 
environment considerably.  However, there are instances of inadequacies, the major 
one being institutional impediments.  According to some studies (Abebe, 1996), the 
existing lack of administrative efficiency, transparency, and accountability at different 
stages of investment offices with particular emphasis of some regions.  The existing 
capacity differences among regional states would have brought remarkable discrepancy 
in attracting the investors.  The general complain on investment policy and regulations 
also note worthy to be mentioned.  The urban land lease system is vague about the 
terms of renewal of lease upon expiry. The high Land lease rate, particularly in capital 
city (Addis Ababa) is also considered to be responsible for low rate of real investment 
(Berhanu and Seid, 1998).  Another missing gap in this regard is access to rural land 
for agricultural investment.  Investors can lease rural land both from regional states 
that is unoccupied and farmers also can rent their land to investors depending on 
respective regional states regulations.  However, there seems no clear regulatory 
framework regarding rural land and differential lease rates have been set according to 
the distance from all weather roads.  The higher lease rate for land near to all weather 
roads and lower rates as one go far away from these roads.  The purpose of these 
differential rates is intended to discourage concentration of investment in large cities 
and relatively developed regions, and to promote investment in remote and 
underdeveloped regions with the objective to bring balanced growth and development in 
inter-regions and intera-regions. 
 
The government seems to be cautious on the land policy, particularly the rural land, 
given the traditional historical context of the country, for fear that peasants might be 
flocking to the towns by selling their farm land and cause social unrest.  The fear that 
farmers may sell their land in time of serious problems is looks plausible anticipation 
given that famine following drought in Ethiopia is becoming chronic condition rather 
than an occasional phenomena.  The government strong commitment to land policy (i.e. 
land is under the government and society), made dissatisfied on the donor side, since 
they always try to impose a much faster pace of reform and liberalization what ever the 
cost is. 
 
In general contributing factors for weak response of private sector, though major macro 
economic variables empirically analysed using econometric model in the next section, it 
is possible to argue in general on some qualitative perception, given their difficulty to  
weak domestic markets (effective demand, credit availability), lack of information and 
weak financial and entrepreneur capacity of domestic private sector are hypothesized to 
be contributing for weak response of the private sector. Another major bottleneck to 
private sector is particularly; regarding regional distribution is poor infrastructure in the 
country in general and uneven distribution among the regions in particular.  Partly the 
reason can be explained that in the past regimes, many regions had been marginalized 
from fair share of development fruits and hence the current decentralization of political 
flower to the regional states believed to enhance the development of regional 
infrastructures.  Obviously, some evidences and changes have been witnessed that the 
government capital budget on infrastructure has been remarkably increasing after post-
reform. 
V. Econometric Estimation of Investment model  
                         5.1 Model specification  
     The model of private investment applied to Ethiopia is an eclectic version of 
flexible accelerator model designed to capture some of the key determinants in 
developing countries. Empirical studies on private investment determinants have done 
to capture some of the specific features of private investment in developing countries; 
here too, the basic accelerator model is modified to support the view that the effects of 
resource constraints are significantly determining private investment behaviour in 
Ethiopia.  
There is a growing perception that such constraints in respect of credit and foreign 
exchange reserves affect both the direction and speed of adjustment of actual stock of 
capital accumulation to desired capital stock.  
                              4.1.2 Model specification  
In the long-rum steady state, private sector desired capital stock (kt*) is assumed to be 
proportional to expected out put (Yte)  
(1) Kt* = a (Yte)  
Because of difficultly in identifying theoretically correct specification and obtaining the 
necessary and reliable data in Ethiopia, this paper does not attempt to build and 
estimate a full – scale structural model of private investment in Ethiopia. Due to this 
fact, rather it is more of exploratory data analysis. Nevertheless the findings of this 
analysis may give supportive idea for those who tries to build a full – scale fundamental 
relation ship between private investment and macroeconomic variables in this county, 
which can then be used to develop appropriate model of investment behaviour.  
 
Macroeconomic variables assumed influence the gap between actual investment to 
desired investment included in the empirical analysis are: - (1) real per capita GDP 
growth rate (2) public investment (3) real credit availability to private sector (4) real 
foreign exchange reserve availability to private sector (5) real exchange rate (5) 
consumer price index (6) government budget deficit and Dummy variable to capture 
structural change 
There fore, private investment is a function of the following macroeconomic variables.  
PI/ GDP = f (RPGR, PB/ GDP, CR/GDP, FRA /GDP, RER CPI, (BDT / GDP)-1, D).  
Where  
PI/GDP = the ratio of private sector investment to GDP  
RPGR = real per capital GDP growth rate  
Pub/GDP = public investment to GDP ratio  
Cr /GDP = real credit available to private sector to real GDP ratio .  
FRA/GDP = the percentage change of foreign reserve availability to private sector to 
GDP, 
RER = the percentage change of real exchange rate. 
CPI = the percentage change in consumer price index.  
BDI/ GDP (-1) = lagged ratio of government budget deficit to GDP. 
D = Dummy variable to capture structural change (D= 0 for the period 1975 – 1991, and 
D= 1 for the remaining period).  
 
                                  5.1.3 Data Exploration  
To avoid non-stationary and spurious results, analysing the nature of each variable 
about their distribution (normal or skewed) and its trend (stationary or non-stationary) 
is the first task in econometric regression. To this affect, first, the ratio rather than the 
level is preferred for each variable. Believing that this does not avoid the spurious 
result particularly due to serial correlation of macroeconomic variables, for most of the 
variables that are expected to suffer from non-stationary, real ratios or growth rates 
have been used. These variables are real per capita GDP growth rate, real foreign 
reserve and real exchange rates real credit availability. All the variables were tested 
for normal distribution. It was found that all variables were almost normally distributed 
results.  
                                       
                                 5.1.3 Estimation Result and Evaluation  
To examine more rigorously the various hypothesis out lined above, four equations for 
private investment rate were estimated for the country, using a time series data for the 
period 1975- 1998. Because of the violation of the assumption of orthogonal between 
the private investment ratio to GDP and real GDP growth rate, a preliminary test found 
that the two are highly correlated. One of the resolutions to such problem is either to 
drop or to transform the variable. Here what was made is that real per capital GDP 
growth rate was used instead. For government budget deficit, because, the information 
on the variable is always available at the end of the year one year lagged value was 
used. To avoid the non-stationary of credit available to private sector, real rate was 
employed instead of nominal rate. Every possible alternative was tried to avoid the 
problem of serial correlation. To capture the policy change since early 1990s, dummy 
variable was included in the specification coded zero for the period 1975 – 1991 and 
one for the remaining period. This tests the difference in intercepts between the two 
periods. This does not mean the inclusion of dummy variable can explain the effects and 
magnitudes on private sector since the policy change. The result of the estimated four 
equations using OLS were presented in table 5.1 
 
 The result of equation (1) suggest that real per capital GDP growth rate and foreign 
exchange availability have exhibited expected positive sign and significant at 5% and 
1% level respectively. Public investment, real exchange rate, consumer price index and 
budget deficit have exhibited negative sign and except budget deficit. The three 
variables are significant at 1% for public investment, 5% for real exchange rate and 10% 
for consumer price index. The remaining variable that is credit availability to private 
sector is positive in sign but insignificant magnitude. The equation was tested for 
multicollinarity using a tolerance value, i.e. (1-(R-squared). A tolerance value of less 
than 0.2 is observed for some of the variables: real exchange rate, CPI, and budget 
deficit. Hence there is a need to avoid some of the variables step by step depending on 
the regression result. The basis for estimating the remaining equation is: (1) the 
presence of multicollinarity between some of the variables. (2) Some of the variables 
such as real exchange rate, CPI, and budget deficit, are proxy the same Condition 
(macroeconomic instability / uncertainty) (3) estimating each variables separately in 
different equation enables us to identity its effect on the goodness of fit of the equation.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 OLS estimation Results for Private Investment Function   
Explanatory 
variables 
Equation 
1 2 3 4 
RPGR 0.046 
(2.22)** 
0.054 
(2.03)** 
0.007 
(0.56) 
0.063 
(2.40)** 
PUB/GDP -0.297 
(-3.35)*** 
-0.254 
(-2.26)** 
-0.199 
(-3.96)*** 
0.207 
(-1.90)* 
CR/GDP 3.775 
(0.45) 
17.717 
(2.45)** 
3.714 
(0.76) 
13.71 
(1.88)* 
FRA/GDP 0.197 
(6.27)*** 
0.131 
(4.27)*** 
0.077 
(3.43)*** 
0.158 
(5.13)*** 
RER -0.048 
(-2.55)** 
------------- -0.030 
(-0.96) 
-------------
CPI -0.71 
(-1.80) 
-0.048 
(-1.11) 
-0.059 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.048 
(-0.96) 
(BDT/GDP)-1 -0.071 
(-0.66) 
----------- ------------ -0.048 
(4.83)*** 
D ---------- 
 
---------- ---------------
- 
2.411 
(4.83)*** 
C 6.844 
(3.37)*** 
5.366 
(3.030)*** 
4.296 
(5.49)*** 
4.787 
(2.90)** 
ADJUSTED – R2 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.97 
DW - statistic 1.81 1.57 1.87 1.89 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels. 
 
 
Variables which improve the predication power (R- square) of the equation will be 
added to the equation, where as those which resulted in the equation weak prediction 
power will be dropped from the equation (Hamilton, pp, 72). With this background four 
equations were estimated. In equation (1) all variables were included. As it has been 
shown in table 4, except credit availability and budget deficit, the rest variables are 
significant at different levels. Real per capital GDP growth rate and foreign exchange 
availability were positively and significantly affected private investment while public 
investment, real exchange rate and CPI were significantly influenced private investment 
in opposite direction over the regression period. In equation (2) two variables were 
excluded from the equation RER and (BDT/ GDP)-1. In this estimation except CPI all 
variables’ coefficient included in estimation are significant at 5% for RPGR, PUB/GDP, 
CR/GDP and FRA/GDP at 1% level and except public investment, the remaining 
variables were positively influenced private investment. When predication power was 
seen, it was less than the prediction power of equation (1) i.e. it dropped from 0.91 (1) 
to 0.84 (2). But there was no problem of multicollinarity between variables as the 
analysis residuals indicated, there is no serial correlation, the error terms are normally 
distributed. However, Durbin –Watson statistics that shows the existence of auto 
correlation exhibited a reduction from equation (1) that is 1.81 to 1.57. 
 Nevertheless, it does not tell us a series problem of autocorrelation. In order to see the 
effect of omitting RER from equation (2), equation (3) was estimated by including RER. 
As it seen from table 5.1, in equation (3) estimation, the coefficient of RPGR, CR/GDP 
are insignificant, with expected sign however (i.e. positive sign). While the remaining 
variables are highly significant with opposite direction of influence on private 
investment, all are significant at 1% level. The other observation from estimation of 
equation on (3) is (1) predication power (as indication by adjusted - R2) has been 
improved as well for Durbin – wanton. To see if there is structural change over the 
period under study, equation four was estimated. In this equation RER was excluded and 
(BDT/GDP) –1 was used to see the effect of its omitting in equation (3), the coefficient 
of all variables included in the estimation are significant at different significant level 
except (BDT/GDP) –1 and their sign is consistent as the preceding equations. Dummy 
Variable included in the equations to capture the structural change confirmed that there 
was structural change (policy change) over the period, which has been substantiated by 
high significance level at 1 %. In this equation both the prediction power (adjusted -R2) 
and Durbin – Waston statistics have shown an improvement over the preceding 
equations (see tables 5.1, equation (4)).  
 From the estimations made through equation (1) to (4) public investment over the 
estimation period showed that in Ethiopia, it had been substituted private investment 
rather to complement it. The estimation results on public investment in all four 
equations were against most of the argument for complementarily between public 
investment and private investment in developing countries. It is not surprising to get 
such results in Ethiopia case, the country where the government capital budget had 
been used to establish prastatals and the government used to participate in the 
economy to the extent of production and distribution of consumer goods those could 
have been purely produced and distributed by private sector for most of the period 
under study (1975-1991). Out of 23 years, 17 years have fallen in the situation 
explained above. The remaining years have been the period of a dramatic change in 
economic policy in general and the role and magnitude of government in the economy in 
particular. Since it was found to be difficult, if not impossible, to estimate separately for 
the post – 1992 effect of policy change due to short period and difficulty to get 
quarterly or six month data on all macroeconomic variables included in the regression in 
the country. Thus the seventeen years negative effect of public investment out weighed 
the possible impact of the remaining years.   
 Fearing such result, because, the regression analysis comprised of two distinct periods, 
I tried to review exhaustively the recent economic performance with particular 
emphasis on private investment to show the post-1992 performance of macroeconomic 
variables using comparative analysis with that of the pre-1992 performance. Therefore, 
the estimation results using OLS over 23 years period of the impact of macroeconomic 
variables on private investment may be used as indicative but not conclusive. Another 
observation from the analysis is real exchange rate, which has been negatively 
influenced private sector. This result can be explained in two ways by looking at the 
real exchange position in two periods. The pre – 1992 period was known by over 
valuation, which was made deliberately to promote import substitution, which had 
negative affected the profitability of tradable goods. When it comes to the post –1992 
devaluation, in the short period of time, devaluation has negative influence on returns to 
investment by increasing cost of imported capital goods. However, it is argued that 
devaluation has a positive effect on the profitability of tradable goods in medium and 
long-term. Therefore the regression results on RER have reflected the real existing 
situation in Ethiopia in both periods.  
Budget deficit has confirmed the negative influence on private investment but with 
insignificant level. The estimated coefficient on CPI has confirmed the negative 
correlation with private investment with less significance. This is the expected result in 
Ethiopia case, where we have historically moderate inflation rate as compared to the 
developing and transitional economic. Even though, it is difficult to tell the relative 
importance of each variable as a determinant of private investement, it is possible to 
explain the relevant elasticity from the estimated coefficient listed table 5.1. In this 
aspect, foreign macroeconomic variables with positive impact on private investment are 
foreign exchange reserve with greatest impact, followed by real per capital GDP growth 
rate and credit availability proxy demand and resource constraints respectively. 
VI.  Conclusion Remarks  
 
The analysis of this paper has demonstrated the economic performance in general and 
the participation of private sector in particular over two distinctive periods.  This is to 
mean the two periods included in the analysis are apparently different both in ideology 
and policy orientation of economic development.  The poor performance of the 
economy has stemmed basically from differences in policy pursued by two governments 
over the period under study. 
 
Behind the poor performance of the Socialist (Derg) regime primarily lies the poor 
performance agricultural sector.  Agricultural out had grown on average at about 1%, 
while the sector accounted for about 65% of GDP, 85% of employment, 85% export 
earnings and provides raw materials for 70% of the country’s large and medium sized 
agro- industries.  Moreover, more than 90% of land under cultivation is operated by 
small – scale landholders.  Therefore, a poor performance of the economy during Derg 
regime came from the decline and stagnation of agricultural sector.  Given the above-
mentioned contribution of agriculture to the economy as a whole, the success of any 
policy measure depends on the extent to which it address the problems of this sector.  
 In general the growth rate of GDP over the Derg regime was on average around 2%, 
while, on the other hand population had been growing at an average of rate of 2.6 
percent.  Obviously, this implies that GDP per capita had been declining significantly 
over this period (1981-1991). The centrally planned economy the country had 
employed, the ever intensified civil war and external sector shocks and the restrictive 
policy on the economy in general, the private sector in particular had led the economy 
to dual nature with low prices for agricultural and industrial goods in the official market, 
while in parallel market, the prices were significantly higher.  The other indicator of 
relative price was the foreign exchange rate, which was more than double in parallel 
market than the official rate led to low, or no incentive for export sector.  These 
restrictive policies led to excessive smuggling and severe fiscal imbalances and balance 
of payment problems, widened saving gap, low capacity utilization in manufacturing, 
severe food deficit and massive dislocation. 
It was against such a distorted economic background that the current government took 
the power over the Derg regime.  The new government has launched comprehensive 
economic reforms, new political and administrative system with the objective of 
creating market-oriented economy, democratic political and decentralized 
administrative systems, respectively.  The central with this is the emphasis it has given 
the recovery of private sector to help enable to play the leading role in the economy. 
 
The out come of policy change could be seen by macroeconomic variables indicators. 
GDP grew in real term at an average rate of 5.5% mainly with the profound up surge of 
industrial and service sectors, which have grown on average 7.3% and 7.7 respectively 
over the period 1992 to 1998.  The other instance to look at the economy is the 
domestic aggregate demand.  All the three (components consumption, investment and 
government expenditure) have shown on increasing trend.  However, the structure of 
the components both in volume and trend has not been changed.  This is to mean 
consumption expenditure constitutes still the lion’s share of aggregate demand, which 
has led the total expenditure to exceed significantly gross domestic product.  By the 
year 1998, the gap stood at 13%.  This implied that the gap was financed by external 
financial sources.  Along this, though gross domestic savings grew at doubling rate 
after the introduction of economic reform program, yet it was able to finance one-third 
of the gross domestic fixed capital formation.  This again implied how much the county 
depended on external source, which may have its own implication on the economy in 
debt servicing in the future. 
 In general, since the launching of economic reform program, the macroeconomic 
variables have shown improvement over the period.  Foreign exchange has been 
improved which can be seen by number of weeks import financing.  At the very 
beginning of the ERP, it was able to finance only 1.3 weeks while it reached peak in 
1996 (33.1 weeks), which then recorded deceleration trend for the remaining two years.  
The other significant change is inflation rate was contained at single digit from peak of 
about 22% one year before the reform program. 
 
Another progress that has been seen during the post reform period is a significant 
recovery in private sector. This could be revealed based on the number of projects 
approved by the Ethiopia investment Authority and Regional investment Bureaus. 
Following the issuance of proclamation No. 15/1992, beginning from July 1992 up to 
January, 2000, 5369 projects have got permit (investment licences), with planned 
investment capital of 56,782,72 billion Birr and these projects when put in to operation 
they are supposed to create job opportunity for about 256, 947 and 477,781 permanent 
and temporary respectively. Out of which 5,144 projects are domestic investment 
licensed and con thought to create for about 227,061 permanent and 432,690 temporary 
employment opportunities. In spite of the enormous number of projects licensed, the 
real investment rate is by far less than satisfactory. For instance, out of the licensed 
project stated above only 28,25 percent have been put into operational and 19.05 have 
started implementation process. The remaining more than 50% project did not yet start 
any process of realization of the projects. Obviously, these show that there is some 
other problems behind to be investigated despite the various measures and gradual 
amendment of investment proclamation to further encourage and promote private sector. 
Thus the evidence that during the past seven years the ratio of actual (real) investment 
to planned investment over seven years period was very low. This low achievement 
rate is despite considerable effort to remove macroeconomic imbalances, the 
introduction and gradual amendment of investment legislation with generous incentives 
and an attempt to remove the restrictions imposed on private investment in the past 
legislations. The hindering factor to examined is only on the macroeconomic variables 
and investment policy; more serious problem is putting the existing policy realization as 
per the intention and desire of the policy objectives.   
 
The other main analysis of this paper is the estimation results using OLS method of 
the determinants of macroeconomic variables on private investment.  The results of 
this study provide some support for the hypothesis that private investment rates in 
developing countries are affected by important macroeconomic variables.   The 
econometric tests under taken support the view that real per capita GDP, public 
investment, credit availability, foreign exchange reserve availability, real exchange 
rate and to a lesser extent government budget deficit and consumer price index 
have all been significant determinants of private investment rates in Ethiopia during 
the period 1975-1998. Of these variables, the real per capita GDP, foreign 
exchange reserve availability and credit availability appear to have had a significant 
positive impact on private investment rates while the public investment, real 
exchange rate and to a lesser magnitude consumer price index have had a negative 
effect.  These results suggest that public sector investment has been substituting 
the private sector in Ethiopia as opposed to most of the empirical findings on public 
sector investment in other developing countries, due to the fact that the majority of 
the years included in the regression have fallen in the period where public sector 
investment was used to establish state-owned enterprises.  Hence, the seventeen 
years period, which featured by the above, mentioned situation out weighed the 
possible positive impact of the public sector investment there after. 
 
The other interesting results from the estimation are the significant negative effect 
of real exchange rate in Ethiopia.  The period 1975-1991 used to be the period of 
multiple and over valued exchange rates, while the remaining period 1992-1998 has 
been the period of devaluation and gradual adjustment the official rate to parallel 
market rate. 
 
Both periods tell us most likely possible negative influence of exchange rate, which 
again confirmed by the regression results.  This is because, over valuation act as 
tax on exports which reduces the return on investment, on the other hand 
devaluation in short-term have a negative impact on tradable goods through 
increasing the cost of imported capital goods as the county highly depends on 
import for raw materials, as well as intermediate goods.  
 
The impact of consumer price index rate on private investment is moderate in 
Ethiopia as can be seen from the estimation results.  These results have confirmed 
that the argument for historically moderate inflation rate in Ethiopia in comparison 
to other Sub-Sahara African Countries and transitional economies. Lastly, certainly 
not the least, the estimation results has confirmed that resource constraints which 
captured by real per capita GDP, credit availability and foreign exchange reserve 
availability to private sector highly and significantly influence private investment 
rate in Ethiopia. 
 
Therefore, developing more effective policy measures that can affect these macro 
economic variables will help promote and strengthen private sector investment activity, 
and there by raise the long-term rate of economic growth. 
 
In line with this, the Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia was declared in February 197, 
which was severely restricting the role of private sector and the government controlling 
over all economy (NGE, 1975). To this end, the government declared subsequent 
proclamations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
                                             Trends in monetary Aggregates  
 
                Table 1.1 
 
Item 199
1 
199
2 
199
3
199
4
1995 1996 1997 1998 1980
-
1990
1991-
1998 
Domestic credit 893
7 
101
06
121
67
127
44
1387
3
1541
1
1714
6 
1893
1 
12.0 9.8
. Claims on 
Gov. 
602
2 
703
2
782
5
961
6
9024 7888 8797 9372 15.7 3.2
. Claims on 
other 
291
5 
307
2
434
2
312
8
4849 7523 8349 9559 7.6 20
Foreign Assets 
(net) 
288 403 810 376
5
4659 6236 5551 5724 -4.1 48
. National Bank 138 108 159 214
3
2345 4901 2874 1963 -- --
. Commercial 
bank 
150 295 651 162
2
2314 1335 2677 3761 -- --
Brother items 
(Net) 
126
3 
149
8
245
5
491
0
4529 5991 6185 6034 -- --
Broad money 796
2 
901
1
105
22
115
99
1400
3
1565
5
1651
1 
1862
1 
11.6 12.1
Money (M1) 613
5 
684
5
771
2
837
3
9909 9917 9980 1097
0 
12.2 7.5
    . DD 231
4 
252
9
282
7
321
4
4066 4261 4803 6220 13 14.4
    . Cur. In 
circulation 
382
1 
431
6
488
5
515
9
5843 5657 5178 4750 11.6 1.8
Quasi Money 182
7 
216
6
281
0
322
6
4094 5737 6531 7651 9.7 21.6
. Saving deposit 167 200 245 284 3649 4984 5699 6485 13.1 20.6
9 2 9 5
. Time deposits 148 164 351 38 445 753 832 1166 -6.1 29.6
           Source: - National Bank Of Ethiopia (NBE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government Performance Indicators 
 
Table 1.2 
Year Domesti
c 
Revenue 
Total 
Expenditu
re 
Deficit GDP Ratio to GDP Percentage charge 
over the previous 
year 
     Revenu
e 
Expendit
ure 
Deficit Ex
p 
Re
v 
Def. GD
P 
1981 1757.1 2296.5 -539.4 10721.3 16.4 21.4 -5.0 -- -- -- --
1982 1876.6 2649.8 -773.2 11280.9 16.6 23.5 -6.9 15.
4 
6.8 15.4 5.2
1983 2174.5 3807.6 -
1633.1
12540.0 17.3 30.4 -13.0 43.
7 
15.
9
43.7 11.
2
1984 2293.8 3198.1 -904.3 11849.3 19.4 27.0 -7.6 16.
0 
5.5 16.0 5.5
1985 2323.2 3924.5 -
1601.3
13876.2 16.7 28.3 -11.5 22.
7 
1.3 22.7 17.
1
1986 2806.1 4131.1 -
1325.0
14493.3 19.4 28.5 -9.1 5.3 20.
8
5.3 4.4
1987 2925.8 4136.3 -
1210.5
15501.2 18.9 26.7 -7.8 0.1 4.3 0.1 7.0
1988 3467.1 5058.1 -
1591.0
15996.9 21.7 31.6 -9.9 22.
3 
18.
5
22.3 3.2
1989 3899.2 5912.4 -
2013.2
16873.4 23.1 35.0 -11.9 16.
9 
12.
5
16.9 5.5
1990 3142.8 5369.2 -
2226.4
17821.7 17.6 30.1 -12.5 9.2 19.
4
9.2 5.6
1991 2706.7 4852.4 -
2145.7
19815.6 13.7 24.5 -10.8 9.6 13.
9
9.6 11.
2
1992 2207.9 4205.3 -
1997.4
20793.0 10.6 20.2 -9.6 13.
3 
18.
4
13.3 4.9
1993 3191.2 5219.4 -
2028.2
26552.0 12.0 19.7 -7.6 24.
1 
44.
5
24.1 27.
7
1994 3938.8 7093.8 -
3155.0
28355.0 13.9 25.0 -11.1 35.
9 
23.
4
35.9 6.8
1995 5912.7 8372.0 - 34063.0 17.4 24.6 -7.2 18. 50. 18.0 20.
2459.3 0 1 1
1996 6966.1 10194.0 -
3227.9
38771.0 18.0 26.3 -8.3 21.
0 
17.
8 
21.8 13.
8
1997 7877.4 10017.2 -
2139.8
41465.0 19.0 24.2 -5.2 1.7 13.
1 
1.7 6.9
1998 8400.1 11460.0 -
3059.9
45188.8 18.6 25.4 -6.8 14.
4 
6.6 14.4 9.0
Source: -Revenue and Expenditure accounts – Ministry of Finance 
- Data on GDP are from MEDac  
               
          
                                                               Percentage 
Share of Capital Expenditure by Sector 
              
   Table 1.3   
  
Sector /Year 
Average over 
the period 
1986 – 1991 
( Derg) 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995
1 Economic Development  91 88.4 84.4 73.3 77.5 
 1.1 Agriculture  23 25.4 18.2 13.9 9.3 
 1.2 Mining & Every 20 14.7 8.3 9.3 8.5 
 1.3 Natural Resource of 
Settlement  
16 16.0 17.8 12.9 14.7 
 1.4 Industry  14 15.4 17.3 9.8 10.4 
 1.5 Road construction 6 6.4 11.1 15.4 23.7 
 1.6 Transport and 
Communication  
8 7.1 7.9 9.6 5.9 
       Financial agencies  2 3.4 3.4 2.2 5.0 
2 Social Development  7 9.6 14.0 23.0 16.1 
 2.1 Education  3 4.0 7.5 9.5 8.5 
 2.2 Health  2 3.9 3.8 2.6 3.8 
 2.3 Urban Dev’t & Housing  1 10.2 1.4 5.9 3.5 
3 General Services  2 1.6 1.3 3.0 5.3 
4 Compensation payment  n.a 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.5 
Source: - Calculated from appendix  _________ table  
               - N.a - data not available  
 
 
 
                                  Deposit by Mobilizing Banks 
   1.4                 
(In Million Birr) 
       Table 
         
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19
All Banks 5121 5672 6750 7992 10111 11976 13878 17
CBE 4415 5022 6228 7436 9598 11194 12702 155
DD 26.03 2870 3461 4211 5504 6038 7065 919
SD 1677 1999 2451 2844 3649 4585 5090 562
TD 135 153 316 391 445 571 547 69
CBB 521 485 359 386 393 409 557 56
DD - - - - 11 38 37 26
SD 76 87 126 161 201 219 261 2
TD 445 398 233 215 181 152 259 28
DBE 185 165 163 170 86 10 38 6
DD      9.4 36 29
SD       2.1 
TD 185 165 163 170 86 0.3 0.1 60
Private 
Banks 
    34 363 581 98
DD     15.1 174.7 205.5 29
SD     18.5 180.7 334.3 60
TD     - 7.8 40.9 9
Source: - NBE  
Note - Average growth rates shown have been computed by OLS 
 
 
                                  Deposit Mobilization by Banks and types of 
Deposits  
 
Table   1.5                 
In Million Birr 
A. 
Growt
h rate 
1992 
- 98 
Aver
age 
grow
th 
rare 
1981
-
1991
 
Item 
 
1981
 
1982
 
1983
 
1984
 
1985
 
1986 
 
198
7 
 
198
8 
 
198
9 
 
199
0 
 
199
1 
1
 
17.6 
 
9.8 
All 
bank  
 
1829
.3 
 
2011
.1 
 
2314
.5 
 
2572
.6 
 
2956
.5 
 
3261
.5 
 
 
371
6 
 
408
2 
 
435
5 
 
485
4 
 
512
1 
5
 
18.7 
 
10.2
Dema
nd 
Depos
it 
 
892
 
984
 
1148
 
1258
 
1531
 
2029 
 
202
9 
 
225
1 
 
225
5 
 
249
6 
 
260
3 
2
 
17.5 
 
11.9
Savin
g 
Depos
it 
 
504.
3 
 
568.
1 
 
684.
5 
 
7996
 
849.
5 
 
1085 
 
108
5 
 
126
7 
 
143
3 
 
163
9 
 
175
3 
2
 
12.9 
 
5.4 
To 
me 
Depos
it 
 
433
 
459
 
482
 
515
 
 
576
 
602 
 
602 
 
564
 
667
 
719
 
765 7
Source:-National Bank of Ethiopia  
Note: -All growth rates were computed by OLS method.  
 
 
 
 
                       Credit disbursement by Clients and source  
Table 1.6                 
(In Million Birr)  
Client/ Year  1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 19
86
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Public enterprise  547.
5 
1052 877.
8 
694.
2 
478.
9 
45
4.4
482.
4 
517.
4 
454 387.
5 
207.
5 
Cooperatives  23.4 58.9 53 76.3 35 60.
2 
94.2 169 178 139.
7 
119.
8 
Private  227.
5 
386.5 362.
8 
284.
9 
230.
3 
21
1.1
172.
4 
205.
4 
187.
6 
204.
3 
216.
5 
Total  798.
4 
1497.4 1293
.6 
1055
.4 
744.
2 
72
5.7
749 891.
8 
819.
6 
731.
5 
543.
8 
Share of Total 
(%) 
           
• Public 
enterpris
e  
68.6 70.3 67.9 65.8 64.4 62.
6 
64.4 58.0 55.4 53.0 38.2
• Cooperati
ve  
2.9 3.9 4.1 7.2 4.7 8.3 12.6 19.0 21.7 19.1 22.0
• Private  28.5 25.8 28.0 27.0 30.9 29.
1 
23.0 23.0 22.9 27.9 39.8
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia  
 
                   
 
        Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at Constant Factor Cost  
Table 1.7                 
(In Million Birr) 
  
Activity/Year 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
1. Agriculture & Allied 
Activities  
6114.8
9
5947.6
0
6308.32 6078.00 6284.0 7206.2 745
 Agriculture  5330.7
1
5147.3
9
5488.27 5271.85 5450.03 6519.76 6879.
 Forest  779.48 795.20 814.77 800.57 828.60 856.80 887.
 Fishing  4.70 5.01 5.28 5.58 5.90 6.10 6.
2.  Industry 1024.1
4
951.41 1222.33 1307.21 1412.5 1492.1 160
 Mining & Quarrying  52.10 38.98 57.10 45.00 49.0 55.74 62
 Large & Medium 
Manufacturing  
336.40 306.90 456.39 514.15 562.4 606.2 640
 Small Scale industry 
&Handicrafts  
200.76 201.33 234.25 237.48 256.5 274.8 29
 Electricity & Water  179.90 186.86 197.80 207.90 219.3 206.4 234
 Construction  254.97 218.15 276.78 302.67 325.3 349.3 379
3. All Services  3729.1 3572.5 4193.7 4525.2 4834.2 5292 5704
3.1 Distributive Services 1304.9
2
1272.1
4
1555.13 1650.98 1757.3 1914.7 2093
 Trade, Hotels & 
Restaurants  
760.82 648.51 887.40 945.22 1027.7 1115.5 1208
 Transport & 
Communication  
544.09 623.63 667.73 705.76 729.6 799.2 884
3.2 Other services  2424.2
2
2300.4
2
2638.64 2874.15 3190.5 3377.3 361
 Banking & Insurance 
Real Estate & Owner 656.56 623.19 681.06
 
747.42 810.3 879.7 954
ship Dwellings  
 Public Administration 
& Defence  
913.45 776.64 1017.84 1125.04 1327.8 1391.5 1483
 Education  271.30 278.50 271.10 278.20 287.94 298.0 318
 Health  90.80 100.00 114.70 136.80 146.51 154 160
 Domestic & Other 
Services  
492.11 522.09 553.94 585.68 618.0 654.1 694
 GDP at 1980/8 
constant Factor cost  
10868.
16
10471.
56
11724.4
2
11910.3
3 
12644.3 13990.3 14767
 Source:  Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation  
*Average Growth Rate for the Period 1992 – 1998 were Computed by OLS 
method 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   Expenditure on GDP at Current Market Price  
Table 1.8                 
(In Million Birr)  
 
Expenditure Components  
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
19
Gross domestic Expenditure 20531.3
2
22077.9
0
28969.4
0
31196.4
0 
37186.2
0
42694.9
0
4
Consumption Expenditure  18534.9
4
20166.8
0
25177.3
0
26902.7
0 
31617.2
0
35448.8
0
3
Government  3165.79 2107.80 2818.80 3155.20 3675.30 4158.10 4
Private  15369.1
5
18059.0
0
22358.5
0
23747.5
0 
27941.9
0
31290.7
0
3
Goss Capital formation  1996.38 1911.10 3792.10 4293.70 5569.00 7246.10 7
Resource Balance  -
1335.99
-
1285.90
-
2298.00
-
2867.50 
-
3301.20
-
4757.30 4
Export of G&NFS  1062.21 937.50 2222.50 3223.00 4852.30 4961.70 6
Import of G&NFS  2398.20 2223.40 4520.50 6090.50 8153.50 9719.00 1
GDP at Current Market 
Prices  
19195.3
4
20792.0
0
26671.4
0
28328.9
0 
33885.0
0
37937.6
0
4
Domestic Saving  660.40 625.20 1494.10 1426.20 2267.80 2488.80 3
Net Factor Income from 
ROW  
-142.31 178.80 14.10 -459.60 -377.50 -275.40 -
Net Current Transfers from 557.11 1011.10 1930.40 2275.80 3651.90 3701.80 2
ROW   
Gross National Savings  1075.20 1457.50 3010.40 3242.50 5542.20 5915.20 6
Gross National Product at   
Current Market Price  19053.0
3
20613.2
0
26257.3
0
27869.3
0 
33507.5
0
37662.2
0
4
Gross National Disposable  19610.1
4
21624.3
0
28187.7
0
30145.2
0 
37159.3
0
41364.0
0
4
Income   
  
Source Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation  
N.B. Growth Rates refer to the period 1993 to 1998. All Growth Rates have been 
computed by using OLS Method except that of the Resource Balance  
 
 
                                                                         Resource 
Balance & its financing  
Table1.9                                                                                             
(In Million Birr) 
Resource Balance & 
Financing Sources  
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Resource Balance  -
1336 
-
1285.9 
-2298 -2867.5 -3301.2 -4757.3 -4479
Gross Domestic Saving  660.4 625.2 1494.1 1426.2 2267.8 2488.8 3440.4
Net Factor Income from 
Abroad  
-
142.3 
-178.8 14.1 -459.6 -377.5 -275.4 -107.7
Net Unrequited current 
transfer  
557.1 1011.1 1930.4 2275.8 3651.9 3701.8 2877.7
Gross National Savings  1075.
2 
1457.5 3438.6 3242.4 5542.2 5915.2 6210.4
Official Transfer (net)  604.3 893.5 1709.7 1647.9 2671.9 2483.4 1471.9
Total financing sources  1679.
5 
2351 5148.3 4890.3 8214.1 8398.6 7682.3
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation 
1996.
4 
1911.1 3792.1 4293.7 5569 7246.1 7919.8
 
Source:  Macroeconomic planning and economic policy analysis Department (MEDaC)  
 
 
            Financing Sources as a Share of Gross domestic Capital Formation (%) 
 
      Table 1.10 
Resource Balance 
& Financing 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 199
sources 
Resource Balance  -66.9 -67.3 -60.6 -66.8 -59.3 -65.7 -56.6
Gross Domestic 
Saving  
 33.1 32.7 39.4 33.2 40.7 34.3 43.4 
Net Factor Income 
from Abroad  
 -7.1 -9.4 0.4 -10.7 -6.8 -3.8 -1.4 
Net Unrequited 
current transfer  
 27.9 52.9 50.9 54.0 65.6 51.1 36.3 
Gross National 
Savings  
 53.9 76.3 90.7 75.5 99.5 81.6 78.4 
Official Transfer 
(net)  
 30.3 46.8 45.1 38.4 48.0 34.3 18.6 
Total Financing 
Sources  
 84.1 123.0 135.8 113.9 1475 115.9 97.0 
Gross Domestic 
Capital formation  
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Computed Based on Data From Table  
NB:  Growth Rates Refer to Annual Average Growth Rates encompassing the period 
1992 to 1998. 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Recurrent Expenditure by Economic classification 
(1986 – 1997) 
Table 1.11   
 Item No.   
1 Wages and Operating  
Expenditure  2333.1 1799.4 2208.
7
 
2811.5 3290.0 3652.3 3
 Wages and Salaries  1394.3 1176.8 1477.
0
1762.2 1893.0 2101.3 21
 Materials & equipment  938.7 622.6 731.7 1049.4 1397.0 1551.0 1
 % Share  69.4 55.3 64.3 62.4 63.9 70.0
2 Grants and contributions 174.5 485.6 328.6 217.8 385.0 387.5
 % Share  5.2 14.9 9.6 5.0 6.8 7.4
3 Price Subsidies  74.7 59.8 6.0 85.1 149.8 174.5
 % Share  2.2 1.8 0.2 1.9 3.7 3.1
4 Pension  132.6 194.3 228.2 274.9 274.4 290.6
 %  Share  4.0 5.9 6.6 6.2 5.3 5.2
5 Interest & Charges  349.4 307.3 530.5 956.9 838.6 922.5
 -  Internal Debt  196.1 246.0 408.9 809.9 596.8 609.9
 -  External Debt  152.4 61.3 121.6 147.0 241.8 312.9
 % Share  10.4 9.4 15.4 21.7 16.1 16.5
6 Safety Net  - - - - 64.1 12.2
 % Share  0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.2
7 External Assistance  295.6 407.1 132.5 53.3 213.5 142.7
 % Share  8.8 12.5 3.8 1.2 4.1 2.5
 Total  3359.9 3253.5 3434.
5
4399.6 5215.5 5582.2 5
 Source:  Compiled from MOF Revenue and expenditure Accounts. 
